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商业信用作为企业短期融资的重要来源,得到企业广泛使用。而对于商业信用这种融资性负债能否发挥其在代理问题上的治理效应还有待探究。本文从双重代理成本的视角实证检验了商业信用作为一种融资性负债是否能够缓解代理问题,抑制代理成本。采用了近年中国A股非金融类上市公司的数据,实证分析发现:商业信用对股东和管理层之间的第一类代理成本及大股东和小股东之间的第二类代理成本都有显著的抑制作用。进一步研究还发现,股权性质并不会影响商业信用对代理成本的抑制作用。本文的研究意义有助于我们更全面的了解商业信用的公司治理效应,也为上市公司降低代理成本提供了新思路。
As an important source of corporate short-term financing, commercial credit is widely used by enterprises. However, whether commercial credit such financing liabilities can exert its governance effect on agency issues remains to be explored. From the perspective of dual agency costs, this paper empirically tests whether commercial credit as a financing liability can alleviate agency problems and restrain agency costs. Using the data of Chinese A-share non-financial listed companies in recent years, the empirical analysis shows that the first type of agency costs of commercial credit to shareholders and management and the second type of agency costs of major shareholders and minority shareholders are significant Inhibition. Further research also found that the nature of the shareholding does not affect the inhibitory effect of commercial credit on agency costs. The research significance of this article will help us to understand the corporate governance effect of commercial credit more comprehensively and provide new ideas for listed companies to reduce agency costs.