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在债委会机制中,由于各债权行抵押担保等风险缓释措施存在差异,授信时点、授信规模不同,企业剩余风险分布不一致,导致各行利益诉求不同,债委会协调难度加大,出现了博弈论中经典的“囚徒困境”。2016年中央经济工作会议强调,要深入推动钢铁、煤炭行业去产能,抓住处置“僵尸企业”这个牛鼻子,妥善处置企业债务。为此,中国银监会提出建立债权人委员会制度,作为落实供给侧结构性改革政策精神的重要举措。但
Due to differences in risk mitigation measures such as collateral and guarantees of various claims and debts, the timing of credit granting, the scale of credit granting, and the inconsistency in the distribution of corporate residual risk have resulted in different interest appeals of various banks and increased difficulty in coordinating debt committees, The classic “prisoner dilemma” in game theory. In 2016, the Central Economic Work Conference stressed that it is necessary to further promote the capacity building of the steel and coal industries and seize the opportunity to dispose of the “zombie enterprise” so as to properly handle corporate debts. Therefore, the CBRC proposed the establishment of a system of creditor committees as an important measure for implementing the spirit of a supply-side structural reform policy. but