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本文研究永久有效及当期有效两种有效期下的碳配额分配方式对厂商决策行为的影响。通过建模,分别推导出这两类有效期下配额的净市场需求函数,并比较分析:厂商在不同有效期下的碳减排决策;厂商在一级市场和二级市场同时存在时的碳减排决策;比较溯往原则与拍卖这两种配额分配方式对激励厂商实施碳减排的效果。研究结果表明:产品的均衡价格在碳配额当期有效时的水平会高于其永久有效时的水平,且永久有效时的配额价格将高于当期有效时的配额价格。而一级市场中的配额价格通常低于二级市场中的价格,且厂商在配额免费分配制度下的产量将低于拍卖分配制度下的产量,但碳减排量则更高。
This paper studies the impact of carbon quota allocation on firms’ decision-making behavior both permanently and effectively for the current period. Through modeling, we derive the net market demand functions of the quotas under the two types of valid periods, and make a comparative analysis: the carbon emission reduction decisions of manufacturers under different effective periods; the carbon emission reductions of manufacturers when the primary and secondary markets coexist Decision-making; compare the retroactive principle and the auction of these two kinds of quota allocation to motivate manufacturers to implement the effect of carbon emission reduction. The results show that the equilibrium price of products will be higher than the level of permanent validity when the current carbon quota is valid for the current period, and the quota price will be higher when the permanent effective quota price is higher than the effective quota price of current period. However, the quota price in the primary market is usually lower than that in the secondary market, and the output of the manufacturers under the quota free distribution system will be lower than that under the auction distribution system, but the carbon emission reduction will be even higher.