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我国企业越来越热衷于研发外包以便更快获取先进技术及新产品,因此研究各种要素及外包条件对R&D外包博弈中攻防结构及接发包商效用的影响具有较高价值。在两方R&D外包模式下,研究R&D外包博弈均衡的双方效用值;设计效用流转及触发威慑规则,对几种研发外包情境中的攻防格局及效用分配做了比较研究。发现,纳什外包博弈均衡解是功利思想和平等思想原则的整合;对于发包商而言,效用流转及威慑触发条件下的新均衡解都优于一般均衡解,而且效用流转相对于威慑触发对发包商的攻防位势更有利,使其均衡效用改进幅度更大。
Chinese enterprises are increasingly keen on R & D outsourcing in order to gain faster access to advanced technologies and new products. Therefore, it is of great value to study the impact of various factors and outsourcing conditions on offensive and defensive structures and the utility of outsourcers in R & D outsourcing games. Under the two R & D outsourcing models, we study the utility value of R & D outsourcing game equilibrium, design utility flow and trigger deterrence rules, and compare the attack and defense pattern and utility distribution in several R & D outsourcing scenarios. It is found that Nash’s outsourcing game equilibrium solution is the integration of utilitarian ideology and equality ideological principle. For the contractor, the new equilibrium solution under the condition of utility circulation and deterrence triggering is superior to the general equilibrium solution, Offensive and defensive positions more favorable business situation, so that a more balanced improvement of its effectiveness.