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在风险投资的企业中,控制权的问题非常复杂,控制权在风险投资家和风险企业家之间的分配,取决于信息不对称、技能、参与约束、努力和控制权收益成本以及讨价还价能力等诸多因素。为了改进效率,风险投资家的控制权通常与其所有权是分离的,而且通常使用特别的金融工具以及安排各种契约和限制来达到控制权的有效配置。本文主要从投资工具的选择、投资方式的选择以及创业企业家的报酬结构设计三方面来研究创业企业控制权的配置问题。
In VC firms, the issue of control is complex. The distribution of control between venture capitalists and venture entrepreneurs depends on information asymmetry, skills, participation constraints, cost of effort and control, and bargaining power Many factors. To improve efficiency, venture capitalists typically have separate control over their ownership, and often use special financial instruments and arrange for various contracts and restrictions to achieve effective allocation of control. This article mainly studies the allocation of control power of start-up enterprises from three aspects: the choice of investment tools, the choice of investment mode and the remuneration structure design of start-up entrepreneurs.