论文部分内容阅读
一般认为,限额存款保险制度让存款人的资产部分地暴露于风险之中,从而市场约束虽然比无保险状态下较弱但仍然有效,因此世界上实行存款保险制度的国家多采用限额保险。本文认为,中国银行业特殊的股权结构,以及长期以来政府对大银行的资金支持形成了存款人“规模偏好”和银行“大而不倒”(too big to fail)的预期;这一预期特征必将异化市场约束,进而导致银行陷入无序的规模竞争并激励其风险承担;如果单纯实施限额存款保险制度,非但不能修正中国商业银行市场约束的异化问题,而且将强化公众的“大而不倒”预期,使市场约束面临更严重的扭曲。
It is generally believed that the quota-based deposit insurance system partially exposes the depositors’ assets to risk, so that although the market constraint is still relatively valid but less insured than in the uninsured state, quota insurance is often adopted in countries practicing the deposit insurance system in the world. This paper argues that the special shareholding structure of the Chinese banking industry and the long-term financial support from the government to big banks have led to the expectation of depositors “size preference ” and banks “big big to fail ”; This expected feature will inevitably be constrained by the alienation market, which will lead the bank into disorderly scale competition and encourage its risk commitment. If the limit deposit insurance system is implemented simply, it will not only correct the alienation problem of the market constraint of the commercial banks in China, but will also strengthen the public “Too big to fail” is expected to make market constraints more serious distortions.