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茶叶生产是控制茶叶质量的首要环节。茶农、茶商以及茶叶企业是茶叶生产和市场供给的主体,根据政府监管效力和市场信息情况,在种植、采摘、加工和销售各个环节具有不同行为表现。依据博弈理论,研究茶叶供给方与政府、茶叶生产企业之间的行为选择,探讨茶叶供给主体的行为动机,为政府制定产业政策和市场监管措施提供理论依据,从而促进茶产业健康发展。研究认为:有效的监管市场能够消除“柠檬市场”效应,提供有质量保障茶叶是理性选择;市场监管缺位情况下,提供无质量保障茶叶能够获取较高的市场收益。
Tea production is the first step in controlling the quality of tea. Tea growers, tea merchants and tea enterprises are the mainstay of tea production and market supply. They have different behaviors in cultivation, picking, processing and sales according to the effect of government regulation and market information. Based on the game theory, this paper studies the behavioral choices between the tea suppliers and the government and the tea producers, discusses the motives of the tea suppliers, and provides a theoretical basis for the government to formulate industrial policies and market supervision measures so as to promote the healthy development of the tea industry. The research shows that effective supervision of the market can eliminate the effect of “lemon market” and provide quality assurance tea is the rational choice. In the absence of market regulation, the provision of quality-guaranteed tea can obtain higher market returns.