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消费者具有为未来需要储存倾向的,对价格变动较为敏感,更愿意通过储存获得跨期套利。供给者可以通过当期价格下降趋势区分消费者对价格的敏感度,进行价格歧视供给。消费者的预期收入增长会对价格变化敏感度降低,减少储存倾向,增加供给者跨期价格歧视行为动机。供给者的储存手段决定了供给者实施跨期价格歧视的可能性,储存工艺先进的供给者对消费者价格歧视的行为周期越长。本文通过建立跨期选择模型,运用不完全信息静态博弈的方法研究供给者和消费者跨期选择行为,结果表明,在博弈双方自觉跨期选择、价格歧视行为下,供给者收益增加,供给者有动力改善储存工艺并延长价格歧视行为;消费者随着收入的增加对价格变化的敏感度降低,消费者储存倾向也随之降低,消费者跨期选择效用变化不显著,同时社会福利趋于增加。
Consumers who have a tendency to stockpile for the future are more sensitive to price changes and are more willing to acquire intertemporal arbitrage through stockpiling. The supplier can differentiate the consumer’s sensitivity to the price through the current price declining trend and provide the price discrimination supply. The expected increase in consumer prices will reduce the sensitivity of price changes, reduce the propensity to save, increase supplier motivation for price discrimination across the board. The supplier’s means of storage determines the possibility of suppliers implementing intertemporal price discrimination, and the longer the cycle of behavioral discrimination against consumers with technologically advanced suppliers. This paper studies intertemporal choice behavior of suppliers and consumers by establishing intertemporal choice model and using incomplete game of static information. The results show that under the behavior of price discrimination, Motivation to improve the storage process and extend the price discrimination behavior; consumers with the increase of income sensitivity to price changes lower consumers tend to reduce storage, consumer choice interactivity change insignificantly, while social welfare tends to increase.