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为降低供应商供应不确定的影响,研究了零部件供应量随机下基于VMI模式的两供应商-单制造商协同供货模型.VMI模式下,制造商确定协同契约,供应商确定零部件的生产量及供应量.提出了收益共享契约和基于剩余补贴与额外惩罚的收益共享契约两种协同机制,分析了其纳什均衡.研究结果表明,收益共享契约不能协调随机供应量的供应链;基于剩余补贴与额外惩罚的收益共享契约不仅能实现供应链的协调,且能实现供应链利润在各参与方之间的任意分配.
In order to reduce the influence of supplier’s supply uncertainty, a two-supplier-single-manufacturer synergetic supply model based on VMI model with random supply of parts was studied. In VMI mode, the manufacturer determines the synergetic contract and the supplier determines the parts Production quantity and supply quantity.The paper proposes two kinds of synergetic mechanisms of revenue sharing contract and revenue sharing contract based on residual subsidy and extra punishment and analyzes its Nash equilibrium.The results show that revenue sharing contract can not coordinate the supply chain of random supply, Revenue sharing contract of surplus subsidy and extra punishment can not only achieve the coordination of supply chain, but also realize the arbitrary distribution of the profit of supply chain among all participants.