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证券分析师是市场解读信息的重要力量。然而最近的研究表明,分析师意见存在系统性的偏差。鉴于此,探讨分析师意见偏差背后的行为动机,剖析分析师意见对证券价格的影响便具有重要意义。本文应用迎合理论,构建分析师与投资者之间的理性博弈模型,证明了在投资者具有信息劣势的博弈中,分析师的迎合动机会放大噪音对其购买意见以及均衡价格的影响。理性投资者并未能消除分析师迎合动机造成的股价噪音,从而从分析师角度,为股价对噪音的过度反应找到了一种理性的微观机制。
Securities analysts are an important part of the market for interpreting information. However, recent research shows that there is a systematic bias among analysts’ opinions. In view of this, it is of great significance to explore the behavioral motivations behind the bias of analysts ’opinions and to analyze the influence of analysts’ opinions on securities prices. In this paper, we apply the theory to construct a rational game model between analysts and investors, and prove that in the game where investors have information disadvantage, analysts’ motivation to amplify the impact of noise on their buying opinions and the equilibrium price. Rational investors have not eliminated the stock price noise caused by analysts’ motivation, and thus, from the analyst’s point of view, they have found a rational micro-mechanism for the stock market’s excessive reaction to noise.