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目前,竞标在线广告位是广大广告主宣传其产品的重要途径之一,在线广告位的拍卖已成为搜索引擎企业最主要的盈利手段之一。在国内,广告位拍卖机制的逐利本质诱发了大量的虚假广告,引发了公众的广泛争议;拥有高报价的广告主并不总是带给搜索引擎用户好的用户体验,这些问题已成为搜索引擎亟需解决的重要问题。本文提出了一种既考虑广告主信誉又考虑用户体验的可信有效竞价广告位拍卖机制,定义了在该机制下的对称纳什均衡,给出了广告主的均衡竞价策略,证明了在该均衡下的配置是有效率的。通过与单纯竞价GSP拍卖机制进行比较,我们发现用户的满意度得到了提高,这增加了搜索引擎的竞争优势。此外,本文的拍卖机制不仅有利于促进广告主提高信誉,在提高搜索引擎的长期均衡收益和拍卖效率方面也有一定的优势。通过数值模拟验证了我们的结论。
At present, bidding for online advertising is one of the most important ways for advertisers to advertise their products. The auction of online advertising sites has become one of the major profit-making means of search engine companies. In China, the profit-seeking nature of advertising auction mechanism has triggered a large number of fake advertisements, triggering widespread public controversy; advertisers with high quotes do not always bring good user experience to search engine users, and these problems have become a search Engine important issues to be solved. This paper proposes a auction mechanism of trustworthy effective bidding advertising space that not only considers the reputation of advertisers but also considers the user experience. The symmetric Nash equilibrium under the mechanism is defined and the advertisers’ equilibrium bidding strategy is given. It is proved that in the equilibrium Under the configuration is efficient. By comparing with the auction-only GSP auction mechanism, we find that user satisfaction has improved, which increases the competitive advantage of search engines. In addition, the auction mechanism of this article not only helps to promote the credibility of advertisers, but also has some advantages in improving the long-term equilibrium earnings and auction efficiency of search engines. Our conclusion is verified by numerical simulation.