作为一种新型管制手段,负面信息披露成为联邦行政机关的偏爱。它可能具有信息通知与警告危险、制裁违法的混合功能,具有成本低廉、促进信息公开、控制风险与促进执法的优势。由于法律控制经验不足,它成了不适用正式程序并自由裁量的非正式行为,伴随权力滥用与权利损害。近百年来,国会仅在极个别法律对其限制,行政机关自我限制的努力有限,法院拒绝司法审查。它面临的特定人权益、公众安全及知情权的价值冲突难题,仍需探索精巧的平衡方案。 As a new type of regulatory instrument, negative disclosure has become a preference of the federal executive. It may have the potential to inform and warn of danger and sanction violations, with the advantages of low cost, promotion of disclosure, risk control and promotion of law enforcement. Due to its lack of legal control experience, it became an informal practice that was not formal and discretionary, accompanied by abuse of power and impairment of rights. In the past century, the Congress has imposed restrictions on it only under a very few laws. The efforts of the executive authorities to restrict themselves are limited. The courts have refused judicial review. It faces the problem of conflicting values ​​of specific human rights, public safety and the right to information and still needs to explore sophisticated balancing solutions.