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信息的自愿披露可能出现供给不足以及质量低下等“市场失灵”问题,而信息的强制披露同样存在某些信息的披露失灵问题,因此,必须寻找信息披露监管的新思路。本文首次基于信息的经济实质,从信息是否可观测与可核实的角度,将上市公司的年报信息重新分为三类:可观测与可核实信息、可观测与不可核实信息、不可观测与不可核实信息。由于强制规则对可观测与可核实信息的管制完全有效,对可观测与不可核实信息的管制只能中等有效,对不可观测与不可核实信息的管制有效性则非常弱,因此,对三类信息应分别采取不同的披露管制策略。
The voluntary disclosure of information may cause problems such as insufficient supply and low quality, such as “market failure ”, and mandatory disclosure of information also has the problem of some information disclosure failure. Therefore, we must find a new idea of information disclosure regulation. For the first time, based on the economic substance of information, the paper divides the annual report information of listed companies into three categories based on whether the information is observable or verifiable: observable and verifiable information, observable and non-verifiable information, unobservable and unverifiable information. Since the mandatory rules are completely effective for the control of observable and verifiable information, the control over observable and non-verifiable information is only moderately effective and the effectiveness of the control over unobservable and unverifiable information is very weak. Therefore, three types of information Different disclosure control strategies should be adopted separately.