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Looking at the prospects for China-Japan relations， it is necessary to not only take into consideration the bilateral situation in 2015， but also the changes in bilateral relations over the past 70 years since the end of the Second Sino-Japanese War （1937-45）， and grasp the domestic and foreign policy trends of Shinzo Abe’s Cabinet.
Features of China-Japan Relations in 2015
Relations between China and Japan have gone through four different stages since the end of the Second Sino-Japanese War. The first stage was from 1945 to 1972， when the bilateral ties were abnormal because of the war. The second stage was from 1972 to 1992， which saw the normalization of diplomatic ties between the two countries with the signing of the China-Japan Treaty of Peace and Friendship and the first ever visit by the Japanese Emperor to China. The third stage was from 1992 to 2012， which saw the rise of political right in Japan and the change in the balance of power between China and Japan. China-Japan relations sought development amidst conflicts during this stage. The fourth stage began in 2012 with the Japanese government’s “purchase” of some of the Diaoyu Islands and its enhanced military deployment against China. Together with Japan’s alliance with the United States， the territorial dispute with China over the Diaoyu Islands has become a major obstacle to improving China-Japan relations. The dispute is also adversely influencing the affections of people in the two countries towards each other more than ever before. The defense agencies of Japan now regard China as their enemy.
Future China-Japan relations will encounter many uncertainties， but as well as further downward pressure there is the potential for fundamental improvement. China-Japan relations in the new stage have demonstrated features that have never been seen before， so to improve bilateral relations， traditional experience and practices may not work， a new assessment should be made and new pathways explored. In 2015， it seemed that bilateral relations bottomed out， but in fact there were more turbulent undercurrents， which created uncertainties and an unclear situation in bilateral relations.
“Cold economic ties， cold political relations，” “warm amid cold”
The Sixth China-Japan-South Korea Leaders’ Summit was held in South Korea， on November 1， 2015 and the Joint Declaration for Peace and Cooperation in Northeast Asia adopted. “Trilateral cooperation has been completely restored on the occasion of this Summit，” it was announced. However， formal bilateral visits between the Chinese and Japanese leaders have yet to materialize. Since 2012， economic and trade ties between China and Japan have seen a continuous downward tendency. In the first three quarters of 2015， bilateral trade decreased by 11 percent over the same period the year before. Direct investment from Japan to China fell by 38.8 percent in 2014， and saw another 25.1 percent reduction in the first 10 months of 2015. In contrast to the reduction of bilateral trade and direct investment from Japan to China， the number of Chinese visitors to Japan soared. In 2015， Chinese made 5 million visits to Japan and Japanese retailers called Chinese travelers’ purchases of Japanese commodities “crazy shopping.” During the Spring Festival and National Day holidays in China， the Bank of Japan will decrease the value of Japanese yen by cutting the interest rate and shops in Japan will also make every effort to attract Chinese visitors. According to Kyodo News， in January 2015， before the Spring Festival， the Embassy of Japan in China dealt with 62，000 visa applications and it is estimated it surpassed 80，000 in January 2016. The Consulate-General of Japan in Shanghai received 186，000 visa applications in January 2016， 1.4-fold of the number in December 2015. In order to promote China-Japan relations and enhance Japanese people’s understanding of Chinese culture， under the support of China’s Embassy in Japan， Chinese groups held a “Chinese Festival” in Tokyo in January 2016.
Abe is hypocritical and seeks trouble with China
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe believes that China-Japan relations saw practical improvement in 2015. In order to solidify this tendency， looking at the overall picture， Abe is willing to further political， economic ties and cultural and people-to-people exchanges with China to create stable friendship between the two countries based on the idea of “China-Japan strategic and mutually beneficial relations.” However， Abe’s Cabinet holds a negative stance toward China’s Belt and Road Initiative， and is even competing with it. Abe holds high the banner of a “proactive contribution to peace” on one hand， yet carries out military expansion against China on the other. His government has also scaled up strategic competition with China in the South China Sea， publicly supporting the US Navy’s so-called freedom of navigation operations. Abe’s government has even deployed Japan Self-Defense Force （SDF） personnel on adjacent islands of China’s Diaoyu Islands and fortified the outlying Okinawa islands to militarize the East China Sea. This has transformed the “China-Japan strategic and mutually beneficial relations” into strategic confrontation.
Huge influence from the political situation within Japan
Abe’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine in 2013 provoked strong condemnation both at home and abroad. As a result， Abe has stopped visiting the Shrine in person， and now offers tributes instead. Although Abe attempted to overturn the Murayama Statement， due to public pressure at home and abroad， he had to incorporate some key words of the Murayama Statement into his statement to mark the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II. In 2015， Japanese people staged protests at the new security laws being pushed through Parliament by Abe’s Cabinet. This shows that peace-loving Japanese people are worried about the forceful adoption of the laws that permit “collective self-defense” and about the possible amending of Japan’s Constitution. The adoption of the new security laws attempted to include content about the Diaoyu Islands as a “gray zone” issue， but this attempt was restricted because of domestic and international opposition. It also reflects that Abe’s position on the above-mentioned issue has not changed， but some adjustments have been made in his administration’s strategies to realize bigger political goals because of the strong opposition both at home and abroad. The Diaoyu Islands is the core concern
Abe’s Cabinet has strengthened its propaganda and military preparation in regard to the issue of the Diaoyu Islands， entering the postwar prohibited zones by taking advantage of Japanese mainstream media’s supportive stance on the territorial issue， thus exerting negative influence on China-Japan relations. In 2015， Japan’s Ministry of Education examined and approved junior and high-school textbooks that stated that the Diaoyu Islands and affiliated islands are inherent territories of Japan. The Japanese government often accuses the law enforcement patrols by China’s public service vessels on China’s territorial waters around the Diaoyu Islands as a so-called invasion of Japan’s territorial waters. Besides， the Japanese government even exaggerates that China’s maritime police vessels are upgrading their equipment， and thus Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force may intervene in the future. Although high-level consultations between China and Japan on maritime affairs resumed in 2015， it seems that it was not in Japan’s interests to establish a crisis prevention and control mechanism with China concerning the waters and airspace of the Diaoyu Islands. Japan has avoided talking about the issue of the Diaoyu Islands. Instead， it has hurried to collect information about Chinese law-enforcement capabilities and strengthened its military deployment in the waters， and drawn up the Japan-US military action plan against China on the issue of the Diaoyu Islands. In 2015， 441 emergency takeoffs were made from Naha Air Base by the Japan Air Self-Defense Force， double the number of four years ago. On June 30， 2015， the Japanese government held a meeting at the Headquarters for Ocean Policy to formulate new basic policies on outlying islands security and management. It determined to deploy surveillance personnel on Yonaguni Island and established an all-weather maritime security mechanism that monitors the Diaoyu Islands 24 hours a day by aircraft.
Highlights of Shinzo Abe’s Diplomatic Agenda and Defense Policies in 2016
In July 2016， Japan will hold the China-Japan-South Korea Leaders’ Summit after the election of the upper house of Japanese Parliament， and it seems Chinese Premier Li Keqiang may attend the summit. In the second half of 2016， China will hold the G20 Hangzhou Summit and Abe will attend the meeting as invited. The bilateral meetings between Chinese and Japanese leaders on such multilateral occasions may bring opportunities for the improvement of China-Japan relations. However， the domestic and foreign policies of Abe’s Cabinet in 2016 may also exert a bad influence on Japan’s national strategy and China-Japan relations. First， the utmost political goal of Abe in 2016 is to win the upper house election for the Japanese Parliament， so as to pave the way for the amendment of the Constitution within his term. To realize this goal， Abe will first turn his people’s attention to the economy and living standards， continuing to promote the so-called Abenomics characterized by quantitative easing， and then warm up relations with China and South Korea to mitigate the negative opinion of the international community. He will also continue to hype a “China threat” in the East China Sea and South China Sea.
Second， the domestic debate on whether to amend Japan’s Constitution will become fiercer. The implementation of the new security laws will overhaul its “purely defensive defense” strategy adopted after World War II. According to the new laws， Japan can use armed force when countries in close relationship with Japan are under attack and when Japan is faced with “survival crisis” at the same time. However， the phrase “countries in close relationship with Japan” is quite vague and may result in willful interpretation. Although Japan’s opposition parties are seeking to abolish the new security laws in the 2016 parliament， the prospects are slight. Japan’s industrial structure may gradually start to change. After World War II， factories producing weapons in the past began producing musical instruments. Attention needs to be paid to whether factories producing musical instruments start producing weapons. The newly founded Defense Equipment Department of the Ministry of Defense will take control of the R&D， manufacturing， purchase and exports of weapons. Military R&D projects have become the favored projects of some universities， research institutions and manufacturers. Once the Constitution is amended， the pace at which Japan’s economic structure militarizes may accelerate.
Third， Japan will continue its armament expansion and war preparations against China in 2016. In 2016， Japan’s defense budget will increase by more than 2 percent， to reach 5.09 trillion yen， a record high. Japan’s defense policy will aim at strengthening its sea and air surveillance forces， particularly those on its southwest islands， and boosting the operation capabilities of its Ground Self-Defense Force. At the beginning of 2016， Japan’s Air Self-Defense Force， for the first time in 51 years， doubled its number of F-15s to about 40 to Naha Air Base in Okinawa to form a new 9th Air Wing. The Japanese Defense Ministry will also set up an amphibious rapid deployment training group. In 2017， an amphibious rapid deployment brigade and a Ground SDF command will be established. In order to conduct “offshore” combat， the divisions （about 8，000 troops in each） and brigades （about 4，000 troops in each） currently scattered in 15 different places will be consolidated in seven places in 2023， and be transformed into rapid deployment divisions and brigades. From 2016， the SDF plans to procure and deploy the following major weapons and equipment： （1） eight-wheeled mobile combat vehicles with a speed of 100 kilometers per hour. Armed with a 159 millimeter cannon and able to fire into the air， these vehicles are mainly used for island recapturing purposes； （2） C-2 large transport aircraft with a range of 6，500 kilometers and a maximum load of 30 tons， roughly four times the load of their C-1 counterparts； （3） 12 MV-22 Osprey combat and transport aircraft for a 17 transport aircraft combat mechanism； （4） 52 AAV7 amphibious assault vehicles with a top land speed of 70 kph and a top speed of 13 kph at sea. These vehicles have a range of up to 300 kilometers， and their bullet-proof shell guarantees a brute-force landing； and （5） the United States’ Terminal High Altitude Area Defense （THAAD） missile defense system. Fourth， Japan is looking to take advantage of hosting the G7 Summit in May 2016， to strengthen the Japan-US alliance against China and promote “two plus two” security talks. Abe is striving for agreement on the South China and East China seas， thus bringing pressure to bear on China. On the military front， Japan plans to further implement the new Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation that came out in April 2015， and strengthen its military drills with the United States， so that， should circumstances demand， the peace time military cooperation between the two countries can smoothly switch to a war footing. Given the difficult situation Russia is now facing both at home and abroad， Abe’s cabinet is also attempting to push for mutual visits of the heads of Japan and Russia， and make Russia give ground on the territorial disputes between the two countries. Besides， Japan is seeking to enhance security cooperation with the Philippines and Vietnam， among other countries， in the South China Sea in a bid to jointly contain China.
Fifth， Japan will engage in more international collective military efforts. At one point after the end of the Second World War， Japan played a constructive role on the basis of its so-called Peace Constitution， through participating in peaceful multilateralism. Sadly， this is now being undermined by Japan’s right-leaning politics. By rolling out its new “security bills，” Japan is more likely to become involved in the multilateralism of violence that has been raging across the international arena since the end of the Cold War. In other words， the regional warfare started by the US-led NATO and other multinational troops is likely to add to the security crisis facing Japan. As such， Japan is expected to ratchet up intelligence gathering efforts and act discreetly in the fight against the Islamic State group. What really merits attention， however， is whether it will continue to secretly support the “World Uyghur Congress” against China.
Sixth， Japan plans to take advantage of the current situation in Taiwan to strengthen ties with the authorities of the island， in an attempt to contain China in the South China Sea and across the Taiwan Straits as well as to tilt the balance in the East China Sea in its own favor. The Taiwan issue is an internal affair of China. However， after Tsai Ing-wen who put forward the “Two State Theory” was elected president of Taiwan， Abe was quick to extend congratulations to her， enthusiastically playing “the Taiwan card.” On December 27， 2015， Nobuo Kishi， Abe’s brother and member of the Lower House of Japan’s parliament， held talks with the visiting mayor of Taipei Ko Wen-je at Japan’s Diet and reached agreement on strengthening ties between Japan and Taiwan. Kishi noted that he hoped to see the Japan-Taiwan Economic and Cultural Exchange Conference for Young Parliament Members which he heads play a major role in energizing the exchanges between the Japanese parliament members and their Taiwanese counterparts. What is worth paying attention to is whether Japan will see Taiwan as central to Japan’s security following the roll-out of the new security bills. Seventh， while Japan signaled to apply sanctions against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea after the latter carried out a fourth nuclear test， the priority of the Japanese government has been given to resolving the issue of the DPRK’s kidnapping of Japanese nationals. And the prospect of Japan acquiring nuclear capabilities has put the United States on the alert. Toshio Tamogami， who was appointed as Chief of Staff of Japan’s Air Self-Defense Force （comparable to an air force general） by Abe when he first took office in 2007， was removed from the post for publishing articles glorifying Japan’s wartime aggression in Asia. In recent years， not only has Tamogami organized national anti-China right-wing groups to provoke China on the issue of the Diaoyu Islands， but also has published a book titled Japan’s Nuclear Armament Plan. One purpose of all this is perhaps to engage the United States in a psychological war. In the book， Tamogami openly highlighted the “China threat” theory， saying the approach of relying on the United States to help secure the Diaoyu islands was not credible， hence the need for Japan to acquire nuclear capabilities within 20 years. To that end， Japan， according to Tamogami， needs to complete the following steps： （1） hype up the “China threat” theory and stoke panic among the Japanese people； （2） disabuse the Japanese people of their sensitivity and resistance to nuclear weapons by reasoning that such weaponry is essential to Japan’s security； （3） retain large amounts of nuclear materials and technologies； （4） enter into cooperation with India on nuclear energy， a country that possesses nuclear weaponry， but remains outside of the Nuclear None-proliferation Treaty （NPT）； and （5） if necessary， work with India in carrying out critical simulation tests on nuclear weapons， and declare to the world to have acquired nuclear capabilities. There are plenty of risks involved in Japan’s cooperation with India in developing nuclear weapons， given that India possesses nuclear weapons but has not joined the NPT. At present， in addition to plutonium for research purposes， Japan has at its disposal 48 tons of plutonium mainly as a result of reprocessing the spent fuel at its nuclear plants across the country. In 2015， the United States once again urged Japan to return the plutonium it borrowed for research purposes. Abe made some conciliatory gestures to the United States at the fourth Nuclear Security Summit in March， 2016， signaling the return the 331 kilograms of plutonium it borrowed from the United States and other countries for research purposes. Misconceptions China and Japan Have about Each Other
There remain some uncertainties in the prospects of China and Japan continuing to mend fences in the future， considering the misconceptions these two neighbors have about one another. Therefore， to effectively conduct China-Japan strategic dialogue， improve bilateral relations and put them on the track of sound development， it is imperative to clear all these misconceptions surrounding the relationship.
Japan’s Misconceptions about China
First， proceeding from the perspective of power politics and geopolitics， Japanese policymakers tend to believe that “maritime nations” and “continental nations” are bound to clash， arguing that were there an alliance of maritime nations centered on the United States and Japan， China would be deterred and contained. When Abe and Taro Aso were first elected to high office in 2006， they proposed to reject “the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity” that China had put forward. After Abe took office for a second time， not only has Japan joined the US-led Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement， it also has been engaged in “strategic confrontation” with China. As a matter of fact， China’s Belt and Road Initiative is completely different from the traditional “Sea Power Theory” and “Heartland Theory.” What China seeks with this Initiative is not hegemony both on land and at sea， but peace and cooperation. In other words， maritime nations and continental ones should and can live in peace and cooperate with one another， witness the active participation of such maritime powers as the United Kingdom and Australia in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank （AIIB）. In today’s era of globalization， any outmoded thinking of drawing the line at sea or ganging up on one another is an “anachronism” which only leads to isolation.
Second， Japan believes that it has the de facto control over the Diaoyu Islands， therefore there is no territorial dispute insofar as the islands are concerned. However， this is but the unilateral understanding of Japan， not a fact. China has never recognized Japan’s “de facto control” over the Diaoyu Islands and has been firmly against Japan’s encroachment of China’s islands and territorial waters. At present， administrative vessels of both countries are present in the waters around the islands. For China’s part， it is indisputable that the Diaoyu Islands are an integral part of China’s territory， whereas Japan thinks otherwise. As such， it is necessary for both sides to acknowledge the fact that there does exist a disagreement between them over the sovereignty of the Diaoyu Islands， if talks are to be held on the matter. However， Japan is doing the exact opposite. Hardly had Japan laid out the new Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation than it started to formulate with the United States military operational strategies against China as far as the Diaoyu Islands are concerned. Such acts spell great danger， as the Japanese government’s attempt to justify its claims on the Diaoyu Islands by giving the impression that it has the “de facto control over the islands” only shows its disregard of historical and legal facts， which further reveals its real intention of seeking regional hegemony. Third， Abe’s cabinet attempts to replace the Murayama Statement on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II with Abe’s on the occasion of the 70th anniversary， thereby ending the established position of the Japanese cabinet of “admitting to the country’s history of aggression，” a position that the cabinet has held for 20 years on the basis of former prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama’s speech. This attempt， however， may never come to fruition. The past few years have seen Abe’s government lodge complaints against China and South Korea jointly constructing the AhnJoong-keun memorial facilities， make carping comments about China submitting its historical archives on the Nanjing Massacre to UNESCO for registration as part of the Memory of the World and hold a dismissive attitude towards China’s military parade to commemorate the victory of the Second World War. However， history brooks no tampering. The Japanese government’s adherence to the spirit of Murayama’s speech is stipulated in no uncertain terms in the China-Japan Joint Declaration of 1998， the third political document between China and Japan. Therefore， it is only right for the Japanese government to return to the position as demonstrated in Murayama’s speech after Abe leaves office.
Fourth， based on the Treaty of Peace with Japan， the Japanese government insists on the postwar international order in East Asia， arguing that this document constitutes the legal basis for Japan to rightfully claim the Diaoyu Islands as its own. However， this argument does not have a leg to stand on. When Japan surrendered in 1945， both its emperor and government pledged to comply with the Potsdam Declaration. In the China-Japan Joint Statement released in September 1972， the Japanese government agreed to honor the eighth article of the Potsdam Declaration which provides that Japan must fulfill the Cairo Declaration of 1943. And the Cairo Declaration stipulates that Japan must return all the territories it stole from China. These are the postwar international order that China and Japan should abide by in East Asia. As for the Treaty of Peace with Japan， former Chinese Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai already expressed strong objection and firm opposition to the Treaty as far back as the 1950s. Moreover， the DPEK and former Soviet Union， among others， also did not sign the Treaty. As such， the Treaty of Peace with Japan cannot be imposed on these countries as a legitimate postwar international order. Also， this Treaty does not clearly define the area that the United States allows Japan to exercise jurisdictional authority over. Fifth， some in Japan believe that the strained relations between China and Japan are attributable to China’s “one-party rule.” This opinion is a result of looking at China through the colored spectacles of ideology， trying to apply Japanese political concepts to politics in China and overlooking the inherent problems with Japan itself. In fact， the party system in China is a multi-party cooperation one with the Communist Party of China （CPC） the ruling party， rather than a one-party rule as the Japanese believe. Besides， it was the government of the People’s Republic of China led by the CPC that normalized ties with Japan in 1972， since which time， our bilateral relations have progressed significantly. What’s more， the CPC has been consistently asking the Chinese people to draw lessons from history and carry the China-Japan relationship on from generation to generation. The twists and turns in the relations between China and Japan， to a large extent， are directly related to the turmoil in Japan’s domestic politics， the frequent change of its leader and the regression in its policy towards China resulting from its increasingly right-leaning politics.
China’s Misconceptions about Japan
First， some in China believe that the reason why China-Japan relations have taken a turn for the worse is because the balance of power between China and Japan has greatly shifted in China’s favor. In other words， China’s meteoric rise has become a bitter pill for Japan， a country that is now struggling amid weak economic growth. This analysis is not without reason. The shift in the global balance of power may directly lead the architecture of international relations to change. However， both the uneven development and shift in power fail to account for why the relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea worsened at the same time as those between Japan and China， when there had not been a similar level of power shift between the two countries， or why Japan’s relations with China and the ROK warmed during the terms of Yasuo Fukuda and Yukio Hatoyama when the dramatic power shift between China and Japan was actually underway. The truth is， whether Japan’s relations with China and the ROK improve or not seems more correlated to whether the right-leaning trend of the country’s politics gain momentum or not than with the power shift between China and Japan. Japanese businesses and society， for the most part， welcome the China’s economic development， especially the rising number of Chinese visitors. Second， some in China hold that the conflict between China and Japan is a conflict between a rapidly rising China and a Japan in pursuit of “normal country status，” saying almost everything Abe has done， be it attempting to amend Japan’s Constitution， removing postwar military restrictions， beefing up military forces， visiting the Yasukuni Shrine， or revising history textbooks， is aimed at helping Japan become a “normal country.” However， Professor Yoshihide Soeya with the Law Department of Keio University noted， “the idea that for Japan to gain ‘normal country status’ means militarizing the country itself is totally different from what the Japanese have thought of the concept. The concept of a “Normal Country” in the eyes of the neighboring countries of Japan is actually alien to most Japanese people.” By put forwarding the term “normal country，” it suggests that Japan should take an active part in UN peace-keeping efforts as many normal countries do， rather than do away with “nationalism” under the framework of the postwar Constitution. Japanese have long ceased to use this concept.
Third， Some in China believe that Japan is seeking to revive militarism， while some reckon that nothing significantly bad will arise as long as militarism remains dead in Japan. However， neither of these two views is in line with the current situation in Japan. Today， China is no longer the China it used to be， and Japan is no longer a fascist country. Besides， great difficulties lie ahead if Japan is to revive its pre-war militarism： first， militarism has completely faded in Japan to such an extent that people there will never allow it to arise again； second， militarism is doomed to fail， and all it will bring is harm and damage. That said， it must be noted that there indeed is a negative energy emerging in Japan. Once unleashed， it poses great risks to China’s security. Some of the representatives of the Japanese right-wing forces have already made it into the decision-making circle. They are in essence charting a right-leaning path for Japan as a major power， in an attempt to break free from the restrictions of the postwar Constitution in terms of politics， law， military and public opinion， and to subvert the Potsdam Declaration and other frameworks of the postwar international order. This is bound to affect Japan’s relations with its Asian neighbors. Therefore， we cannot rule out the possibility that Japan will further strengthen its military forces， drills and deployment against China that， given certain circumstances， may erupt into a military confrontation with China over the Diaoyu Islands. Fourth， some believe that China can bring Japan to heel and make it back down on both historical and territorial issues by boycotting Japanese goods. However， not only will blindly boycotting Japanese goods not solve the territorial dispute between China and Japan， it may even threaten to undermine China’s investment and tourism environment and cause chaos in Chinese society’s sentiments toward Japan. After the Japanese government “purchased” the Diaoyu Islands in September 2012， incidents of violence and vandalism targeting Japanese companies， shops and goods broke out in some Chinese cities incited by people under the pretext of patriotism. These incidents， illegal and tantamount to crimes， not only almost sparked an “international image crisis” for China， but were also used by the Japanese right-wing forces to the advantage of their candidates in the country’s election. As a result， the friendliness of the Japanese people towards the Chinese people has hit a new low， and the Japanese right-wing politicians， after winning the election， became more hostile and aggressive towards China. That said， it is necessary to follow closely the future development of China-Japan relations and take precautions against the Japanese right-wing anti-China forces. Besides， the rising number of Chinese people traveling and shopping in Japan has nothing to do with politics， rather it is attributable to a weakening of the Japanese yen against the Chinese yuan and Japan’s streamlined visa application process for Chinese visitors. Chinese factories and businesses should view this as an opportunity to study the market demand in Japan and accordingly develop marketable， good-quality and better-priced goods.
Fifth， some in China hold that Japanese society is on the whole drifting to the right， therefore whoever takes office next will not make much difference. This， however， is an overgeneralization， not a fact. Although Yohei Kono and other moderate liberals have pointed out that Japan has drifted to the right since the end of the Cold War， this does not necessarily follow that there are no good-natured people in Japan. Throughout 2015， Abe also met with quite some internal opposition， be it to his visiting the Yosukuni Shrine， his ramming through the new security bills， his speech on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the war’s end， his attempt to amend the Constitution or his position on the US marine base on Okinawa. Some middle school students and housewives even took to the streets to join the protests against Abe’s Cabinet ramming through the new security bills. Some Japanese non-governmental groups organized meetings where people who experienced the Nanjing Massacre gave speeches about that ordeal， in part to go against the Japanese right-wing forces and stop Japan from continuing to move to the right. Meanwhile， some parliament members， local governments and nongovernmental groups want to improve Japan’s relations with China. Many young members of the Japanese parliament， while visiting China， paid special visits to the memorials in Beijing， Nanjing and Shenyang， thus further cementing their determination to promote the friendship between China and Japan. Given that the issue of Diaoyu Islands has long been stalled， so much so that the most Japanese people， including the left-wing forces in the Communist Party of Japan， are under the impression that the islands belong to Japan， it is not proper to view Japan’s position on the Diaoyu Islands as a sign that the country as a whole is drifting to the right.
Looking to the future of China-Japan relations， we need to be aware of the crux of the problem and have confidence in the bright prospects for the relations. After all， what shapes China-Japan relations is the sovereignty dispute over the Diaoyu Islands. And if the Japanese people could gain a real understanding of the true historical story and the Japanese government could ditch the antiquated geopolitical thinking and pursue peace and cooperation with China at sea and on land， China and Japan are bound to find a solution to this long-standing thorny issue. Despite the odds that are against this now， there is reason to be optimistic that the friendship between China and Japan can be forged for generations to come.
Features of China-Japan Relations in 2015
Relations between China and Japan have gone through four different stages since the end of the Second Sino-Japanese War. The first stage was from 1945 to 1972， when the bilateral ties were abnormal because of the war. The second stage was from 1972 to 1992， which saw the normalization of diplomatic ties between the two countries with the signing of the China-Japan Treaty of Peace and Friendship and the first ever visit by the Japanese Emperor to China. The third stage was from 1992 to 2012， which saw the rise of political right in Japan and the change in the balance of power between China and Japan. China-Japan relations sought development amidst conflicts during this stage. The fourth stage began in 2012 with the Japanese government’s “purchase” of some of the Diaoyu Islands and its enhanced military deployment against China. Together with Japan’s alliance with the United States， the territorial dispute with China over the Diaoyu Islands has become a major obstacle to improving China-Japan relations. The dispute is also adversely influencing the affections of people in the two countries towards each other more than ever before. The defense agencies of Japan now regard China as their enemy.
Future China-Japan relations will encounter many uncertainties， but as well as further downward pressure there is the potential for fundamental improvement. China-Japan relations in the new stage have demonstrated features that have never been seen before， so to improve bilateral relations， traditional experience and practices may not work， a new assessment should be made and new pathways explored. In 2015， it seemed that bilateral relations bottomed out， but in fact there were more turbulent undercurrents， which created uncertainties and an unclear situation in bilateral relations.
“Cold economic ties， cold political relations，” “warm amid cold”
The Sixth China-Japan-South Korea Leaders’ Summit was held in South Korea， on November 1， 2015 and the Joint Declaration for Peace and Cooperation in Northeast Asia adopted. “Trilateral cooperation has been completely restored on the occasion of this Summit，” it was announced. However， formal bilateral visits between the Chinese and Japanese leaders have yet to materialize. Since 2012， economic and trade ties between China and Japan have seen a continuous downward tendency. In the first three quarters of 2015， bilateral trade decreased by 11 percent over the same period the year before. Direct investment from Japan to China fell by 38.8 percent in 2014， and saw another 25.1 percent reduction in the first 10 months of 2015. In contrast to the reduction of bilateral trade and direct investment from Japan to China， the number of Chinese visitors to Japan soared. In 2015， Chinese made 5 million visits to Japan and Japanese retailers called Chinese travelers’ purchases of Japanese commodities “crazy shopping.” During the Spring Festival and National Day holidays in China， the Bank of Japan will decrease the value of Japanese yen by cutting the interest rate and shops in Japan will also make every effort to attract Chinese visitors. According to Kyodo News， in January 2015， before the Spring Festival， the Embassy of Japan in China dealt with 62，000 visa applications and it is estimated it surpassed 80，000 in January 2016. The Consulate-General of Japan in Shanghai received 186，000 visa applications in January 2016， 1.4-fold of the number in December 2015. In order to promote China-Japan relations and enhance Japanese people’s understanding of Chinese culture， under the support of China’s Embassy in Japan， Chinese groups held a “Chinese Festival” in Tokyo in January 2016.
Abe is hypocritical and seeks trouble with China
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe believes that China-Japan relations saw practical improvement in 2015. In order to solidify this tendency， looking at the overall picture， Abe is willing to further political， economic ties and cultural and people-to-people exchanges with China to create stable friendship between the two countries based on the idea of “China-Japan strategic and mutually beneficial relations.” However， Abe’s Cabinet holds a negative stance toward China’s Belt and Road Initiative， and is even competing with it. Abe holds high the banner of a “proactive contribution to peace” on one hand， yet carries out military expansion against China on the other. His government has also scaled up strategic competition with China in the South China Sea， publicly supporting the US Navy’s so-called freedom of navigation operations. Abe’s government has even deployed Japan Self-Defense Force （SDF） personnel on adjacent islands of China’s Diaoyu Islands and fortified the outlying Okinawa islands to militarize the East China Sea. This has transformed the “China-Japan strategic and mutually beneficial relations” into strategic confrontation.
Huge influence from the political situation within Japan
Abe’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine in 2013 provoked strong condemnation both at home and abroad. As a result， Abe has stopped visiting the Shrine in person， and now offers tributes instead. Although Abe attempted to overturn the Murayama Statement， due to public pressure at home and abroad， he had to incorporate some key words of the Murayama Statement into his statement to mark the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II. In 2015， Japanese people staged protests at the new security laws being pushed through Parliament by Abe’s Cabinet. This shows that peace-loving Japanese people are worried about the forceful adoption of the laws that permit “collective self-defense” and about the possible amending of Japan’s Constitution. The adoption of the new security laws attempted to include content about the Diaoyu Islands as a “gray zone” issue， but this attempt was restricted because of domestic and international opposition. It also reflects that Abe’s position on the above-mentioned issue has not changed， but some adjustments have been made in his administration’s strategies to realize bigger political goals because of the strong opposition both at home and abroad. The Diaoyu Islands is the core concern
Abe’s Cabinet has strengthened its propaganda and military preparation in regard to the issue of the Diaoyu Islands， entering the postwar prohibited zones by taking advantage of Japanese mainstream media’s supportive stance on the territorial issue， thus exerting negative influence on China-Japan relations. In 2015， Japan’s Ministry of Education examined and approved junior and high-school textbooks that stated that the Diaoyu Islands and affiliated islands are inherent territories of Japan. The Japanese government often accuses the law enforcement patrols by China’s public service vessels on China’s territorial waters around the Diaoyu Islands as a so-called invasion of Japan’s territorial waters. Besides， the Japanese government even exaggerates that China’s maritime police vessels are upgrading their equipment， and thus Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force may intervene in the future. Although high-level consultations between China and Japan on maritime affairs resumed in 2015， it seems that it was not in Japan’s interests to establish a crisis prevention and control mechanism with China concerning the waters and airspace of the Diaoyu Islands. Japan has avoided talking about the issue of the Diaoyu Islands. Instead， it has hurried to collect information about Chinese law-enforcement capabilities and strengthened its military deployment in the waters， and drawn up the Japan-US military action plan against China on the issue of the Diaoyu Islands. In 2015， 441 emergency takeoffs were made from Naha Air Base by the Japan Air Self-Defense Force， double the number of four years ago. On June 30， 2015， the Japanese government held a meeting at the Headquarters for Ocean Policy to formulate new basic policies on outlying islands security and management. It determined to deploy surveillance personnel on Yonaguni Island and established an all-weather maritime security mechanism that monitors the Diaoyu Islands 24 hours a day by aircraft.
Highlights of Shinzo Abe’s Diplomatic Agenda and Defense Policies in 2016
In July 2016， Japan will hold the China-Japan-South Korea Leaders’ Summit after the election of the upper house of Japanese Parliament， and it seems Chinese Premier Li Keqiang may attend the summit. In the second half of 2016， China will hold the G20 Hangzhou Summit and Abe will attend the meeting as invited. The bilateral meetings between Chinese and Japanese leaders on such multilateral occasions may bring opportunities for the improvement of China-Japan relations. However， the domestic and foreign policies of Abe’s Cabinet in 2016 may also exert a bad influence on Japan’s national strategy and China-Japan relations. First， the utmost political goal of Abe in 2016 is to win the upper house election for the Japanese Parliament， so as to pave the way for the amendment of the Constitution within his term. To realize this goal， Abe will first turn his people’s attention to the economy and living standards， continuing to promote the so-called Abenomics characterized by quantitative easing， and then warm up relations with China and South Korea to mitigate the negative opinion of the international community. He will also continue to hype a “China threat” in the East China Sea and South China Sea.
Second， the domestic debate on whether to amend Japan’s Constitution will become fiercer. The implementation of the new security laws will overhaul its “purely defensive defense” strategy adopted after World War II. According to the new laws， Japan can use armed force when countries in close relationship with Japan are under attack and when Japan is faced with “survival crisis” at the same time. However， the phrase “countries in close relationship with Japan” is quite vague and may result in willful interpretation. Although Japan’s opposition parties are seeking to abolish the new security laws in the 2016 parliament， the prospects are slight. Japan’s industrial structure may gradually start to change. After World War II， factories producing weapons in the past began producing musical instruments. Attention needs to be paid to whether factories producing musical instruments start producing weapons. The newly founded Defense Equipment Department of the Ministry of Defense will take control of the R&D， manufacturing， purchase and exports of weapons. Military R&D projects have become the favored projects of some universities， research institutions and manufacturers. Once the Constitution is amended， the pace at which Japan’s economic structure militarizes may accelerate.
Third， Japan will continue its armament expansion and war preparations against China in 2016. In 2016， Japan’s defense budget will increase by more than 2 percent， to reach 5.09 trillion yen， a record high. Japan’s defense policy will aim at strengthening its sea and air surveillance forces， particularly those on its southwest islands， and boosting the operation capabilities of its Ground Self-Defense Force. At the beginning of 2016， Japan’s Air Self-Defense Force， for the first time in 51 years， doubled its number of F-15s to about 40 to Naha Air Base in Okinawa to form a new 9th Air Wing. The Japanese Defense Ministry will also set up an amphibious rapid deployment training group. In 2017， an amphibious rapid deployment brigade and a Ground SDF command will be established. In order to conduct “offshore” combat， the divisions （about 8，000 troops in each） and brigades （about 4，000 troops in each） currently scattered in 15 different places will be consolidated in seven places in 2023， and be transformed into rapid deployment divisions and brigades. From 2016， the SDF plans to procure and deploy the following major weapons and equipment： （1） eight-wheeled mobile combat vehicles with a speed of 100 kilometers per hour. Armed with a 159 millimeter cannon and able to fire into the air， these vehicles are mainly used for island recapturing purposes； （2） C-2 large transport aircraft with a range of 6，500 kilometers and a maximum load of 30 tons， roughly four times the load of their C-1 counterparts； （3） 12 MV-22 Osprey combat and transport aircraft for a 17 transport aircraft combat mechanism； （4） 52 AAV7 amphibious assault vehicles with a top land speed of 70 kph and a top speed of 13 kph at sea. These vehicles have a range of up to 300 kilometers， and their bullet-proof shell guarantees a brute-force landing； and （5） the United States’ Terminal High Altitude Area Defense （THAAD） missile defense system. Fourth， Japan is looking to take advantage of hosting the G7 Summit in May 2016， to strengthen the Japan-US alliance against China and promote “two plus two” security talks. Abe is striving for agreement on the South China and East China seas， thus bringing pressure to bear on China. On the military front， Japan plans to further implement the new Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation that came out in April 2015， and strengthen its military drills with the United States， so that， should circumstances demand， the peace time military cooperation between the two countries can smoothly switch to a war footing. Given the difficult situation Russia is now facing both at home and abroad， Abe’s cabinet is also attempting to push for mutual visits of the heads of Japan and Russia， and make Russia give ground on the territorial disputes between the two countries. Besides， Japan is seeking to enhance security cooperation with the Philippines and Vietnam， among other countries， in the South China Sea in a bid to jointly contain China.
Fifth， Japan will engage in more international collective military efforts. At one point after the end of the Second World War， Japan played a constructive role on the basis of its so-called Peace Constitution， through participating in peaceful multilateralism. Sadly， this is now being undermined by Japan’s right-leaning politics. By rolling out its new “security bills，” Japan is more likely to become involved in the multilateralism of violence that has been raging across the international arena since the end of the Cold War. In other words， the regional warfare started by the US-led NATO and other multinational troops is likely to add to the security crisis facing Japan. As such， Japan is expected to ratchet up intelligence gathering efforts and act discreetly in the fight against the Islamic State group. What really merits attention， however， is whether it will continue to secretly support the “World Uyghur Congress” against China.
Sixth， Japan plans to take advantage of the current situation in Taiwan to strengthen ties with the authorities of the island， in an attempt to contain China in the South China Sea and across the Taiwan Straits as well as to tilt the balance in the East China Sea in its own favor. The Taiwan issue is an internal affair of China. However， after Tsai Ing-wen who put forward the “Two State Theory” was elected president of Taiwan， Abe was quick to extend congratulations to her， enthusiastically playing “the Taiwan card.” On December 27， 2015， Nobuo Kishi， Abe’s brother and member of the Lower House of Japan’s parliament， held talks with the visiting mayor of Taipei Ko Wen-je at Japan’s Diet and reached agreement on strengthening ties between Japan and Taiwan. Kishi noted that he hoped to see the Japan-Taiwan Economic and Cultural Exchange Conference for Young Parliament Members which he heads play a major role in energizing the exchanges between the Japanese parliament members and their Taiwanese counterparts. What is worth paying attention to is whether Japan will see Taiwan as central to Japan’s security following the roll-out of the new security bills. Seventh， while Japan signaled to apply sanctions against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea after the latter carried out a fourth nuclear test， the priority of the Japanese government has been given to resolving the issue of the DPRK’s kidnapping of Japanese nationals. And the prospect of Japan acquiring nuclear capabilities has put the United States on the alert. Toshio Tamogami， who was appointed as Chief of Staff of Japan’s Air Self-Defense Force （comparable to an air force general） by Abe when he first took office in 2007， was removed from the post for publishing articles glorifying Japan’s wartime aggression in Asia. In recent years， not only has Tamogami organized national anti-China right-wing groups to provoke China on the issue of the Diaoyu Islands， but also has published a book titled Japan’s Nuclear Armament Plan. One purpose of all this is perhaps to engage the United States in a psychological war. In the book， Tamogami openly highlighted the “China threat” theory， saying the approach of relying on the United States to help secure the Diaoyu islands was not credible， hence the need for Japan to acquire nuclear capabilities within 20 years. To that end， Japan， according to Tamogami， needs to complete the following steps： （1） hype up the “China threat” theory and stoke panic among the Japanese people； （2） disabuse the Japanese people of their sensitivity and resistance to nuclear weapons by reasoning that such weaponry is essential to Japan’s security； （3） retain large amounts of nuclear materials and technologies； （4） enter into cooperation with India on nuclear energy， a country that possesses nuclear weaponry， but remains outside of the Nuclear None-proliferation Treaty （NPT）； and （5） if necessary， work with India in carrying out critical simulation tests on nuclear weapons， and declare to the world to have acquired nuclear capabilities. There are plenty of risks involved in Japan’s cooperation with India in developing nuclear weapons， given that India possesses nuclear weapons but has not joined the NPT. At present， in addition to plutonium for research purposes， Japan has at its disposal 48 tons of plutonium mainly as a result of reprocessing the spent fuel at its nuclear plants across the country. In 2015， the United States once again urged Japan to return the plutonium it borrowed for research purposes. Abe made some conciliatory gestures to the United States at the fourth Nuclear Security Summit in March， 2016， signaling the return the 331 kilograms of plutonium it borrowed from the United States and other countries for research purposes. Misconceptions China and Japan Have about Each Other
There remain some uncertainties in the prospects of China and Japan continuing to mend fences in the future， considering the misconceptions these two neighbors have about one another. Therefore， to effectively conduct China-Japan strategic dialogue， improve bilateral relations and put them on the track of sound development， it is imperative to clear all these misconceptions surrounding the relationship.
Japan’s Misconceptions about China
First， proceeding from the perspective of power politics and geopolitics， Japanese policymakers tend to believe that “maritime nations” and “continental nations” are bound to clash， arguing that were there an alliance of maritime nations centered on the United States and Japan， China would be deterred and contained. When Abe and Taro Aso were first elected to high office in 2006， they proposed to reject “the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity” that China had put forward. After Abe took office for a second time， not only has Japan joined the US-led Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement， it also has been engaged in “strategic confrontation” with China. As a matter of fact， China’s Belt and Road Initiative is completely different from the traditional “Sea Power Theory” and “Heartland Theory.” What China seeks with this Initiative is not hegemony both on land and at sea， but peace and cooperation. In other words， maritime nations and continental ones should and can live in peace and cooperate with one another， witness the active participation of such maritime powers as the United Kingdom and Australia in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank （AIIB）. In today’s era of globalization， any outmoded thinking of drawing the line at sea or ganging up on one another is an “anachronism” which only leads to isolation.
Second， Japan believes that it has the de facto control over the Diaoyu Islands， therefore there is no territorial dispute insofar as the islands are concerned. However， this is but the unilateral understanding of Japan， not a fact. China has never recognized Japan’s “de facto control” over the Diaoyu Islands and has been firmly against Japan’s encroachment of China’s islands and territorial waters. At present， administrative vessels of both countries are present in the waters around the islands. For China’s part， it is indisputable that the Diaoyu Islands are an integral part of China’s territory， whereas Japan thinks otherwise. As such， it is necessary for both sides to acknowledge the fact that there does exist a disagreement between them over the sovereignty of the Diaoyu Islands， if talks are to be held on the matter. However， Japan is doing the exact opposite. Hardly had Japan laid out the new Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation than it started to formulate with the United States military operational strategies against China as far as the Diaoyu Islands are concerned. Such acts spell great danger， as the Japanese government’s attempt to justify its claims on the Diaoyu Islands by giving the impression that it has the “de facto control over the islands” only shows its disregard of historical and legal facts， which further reveals its real intention of seeking regional hegemony. Third， Abe’s cabinet attempts to replace the Murayama Statement on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II with Abe’s on the occasion of the 70th anniversary， thereby ending the established position of the Japanese cabinet of “admitting to the country’s history of aggression，” a position that the cabinet has held for 20 years on the basis of former prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama’s speech. This attempt， however， may never come to fruition. The past few years have seen Abe’s government lodge complaints against China and South Korea jointly constructing the AhnJoong-keun memorial facilities， make carping comments about China submitting its historical archives on the Nanjing Massacre to UNESCO for registration as part of the Memory of the World and hold a dismissive attitude towards China’s military parade to commemorate the victory of the Second World War. However， history brooks no tampering. The Japanese government’s adherence to the spirit of Murayama’s speech is stipulated in no uncertain terms in the China-Japan Joint Declaration of 1998， the third political document between China and Japan. Therefore， it is only right for the Japanese government to return to the position as demonstrated in Murayama’s speech after Abe leaves office.
Fourth， based on the Treaty of Peace with Japan， the Japanese government insists on the postwar international order in East Asia， arguing that this document constitutes the legal basis for Japan to rightfully claim the Diaoyu Islands as its own. However， this argument does not have a leg to stand on. When Japan surrendered in 1945， both its emperor and government pledged to comply with the Potsdam Declaration. In the China-Japan Joint Statement released in September 1972， the Japanese government agreed to honor the eighth article of the Potsdam Declaration which provides that Japan must fulfill the Cairo Declaration of 1943. And the Cairo Declaration stipulates that Japan must return all the territories it stole from China. These are the postwar international order that China and Japan should abide by in East Asia. As for the Treaty of Peace with Japan， former Chinese Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai already expressed strong objection and firm opposition to the Treaty as far back as the 1950s. Moreover， the DPEK and former Soviet Union， among others， also did not sign the Treaty. As such， the Treaty of Peace with Japan cannot be imposed on these countries as a legitimate postwar international order. Also， this Treaty does not clearly define the area that the United States allows Japan to exercise jurisdictional authority over. Fifth， some in Japan believe that the strained relations between China and Japan are attributable to China’s “one-party rule.” This opinion is a result of looking at China through the colored spectacles of ideology， trying to apply Japanese political concepts to politics in China and overlooking the inherent problems with Japan itself. In fact， the party system in China is a multi-party cooperation one with the Communist Party of China （CPC） the ruling party， rather than a one-party rule as the Japanese believe. Besides， it was the government of the People’s Republic of China led by the CPC that normalized ties with Japan in 1972， since which time， our bilateral relations have progressed significantly. What’s more， the CPC has been consistently asking the Chinese people to draw lessons from history and carry the China-Japan relationship on from generation to generation. The twists and turns in the relations between China and Japan， to a large extent， are directly related to the turmoil in Japan’s domestic politics， the frequent change of its leader and the regression in its policy towards China resulting from its increasingly right-leaning politics.
China’s Misconceptions about Japan
First， some in China believe that the reason why China-Japan relations have taken a turn for the worse is because the balance of power between China and Japan has greatly shifted in China’s favor. In other words， China’s meteoric rise has become a bitter pill for Japan， a country that is now struggling amid weak economic growth. This analysis is not without reason. The shift in the global balance of power may directly lead the architecture of international relations to change. However， both the uneven development and shift in power fail to account for why the relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea worsened at the same time as those between Japan and China， when there had not been a similar level of power shift between the two countries， or why Japan’s relations with China and the ROK warmed during the terms of Yasuo Fukuda and Yukio Hatoyama when the dramatic power shift between China and Japan was actually underway. The truth is， whether Japan’s relations with China and the ROK improve or not seems more correlated to whether the right-leaning trend of the country’s politics gain momentum or not than with the power shift between China and Japan. Japanese businesses and society， for the most part， welcome the China’s economic development， especially the rising number of Chinese visitors. Second， some in China hold that the conflict between China and Japan is a conflict between a rapidly rising China and a Japan in pursuit of “normal country status，” saying almost everything Abe has done， be it attempting to amend Japan’s Constitution， removing postwar military restrictions， beefing up military forces， visiting the Yasukuni Shrine， or revising history textbooks， is aimed at helping Japan become a “normal country.” However， Professor Yoshihide Soeya with the Law Department of Keio University noted， “the idea that for Japan to gain ‘normal country status’ means militarizing the country itself is totally different from what the Japanese have thought of the concept. The concept of a “Normal Country” in the eyes of the neighboring countries of Japan is actually alien to most Japanese people.” By put forwarding the term “normal country，” it suggests that Japan should take an active part in UN peace-keeping efforts as many normal countries do， rather than do away with “nationalism” under the framework of the postwar Constitution. Japanese have long ceased to use this concept.
Third， Some in China believe that Japan is seeking to revive militarism， while some reckon that nothing significantly bad will arise as long as militarism remains dead in Japan. However， neither of these two views is in line with the current situation in Japan. Today， China is no longer the China it used to be， and Japan is no longer a fascist country. Besides， great difficulties lie ahead if Japan is to revive its pre-war militarism： first， militarism has completely faded in Japan to such an extent that people there will never allow it to arise again； second， militarism is doomed to fail， and all it will bring is harm and damage. That said， it must be noted that there indeed is a negative energy emerging in Japan. Once unleashed， it poses great risks to China’s security. Some of the representatives of the Japanese right-wing forces have already made it into the decision-making circle. They are in essence charting a right-leaning path for Japan as a major power， in an attempt to break free from the restrictions of the postwar Constitution in terms of politics， law， military and public opinion， and to subvert the Potsdam Declaration and other frameworks of the postwar international order. This is bound to affect Japan’s relations with its Asian neighbors. Therefore， we cannot rule out the possibility that Japan will further strengthen its military forces， drills and deployment against China that， given certain circumstances， may erupt into a military confrontation with China over the Diaoyu Islands. Fourth， some believe that China can bring Japan to heel and make it back down on both historical and territorial issues by boycotting Japanese goods. However， not only will blindly boycotting Japanese goods not solve the territorial dispute between China and Japan， it may even threaten to undermine China’s investment and tourism environment and cause chaos in Chinese society’s sentiments toward Japan. After the Japanese government “purchased” the Diaoyu Islands in September 2012， incidents of violence and vandalism targeting Japanese companies， shops and goods broke out in some Chinese cities incited by people under the pretext of patriotism. These incidents， illegal and tantamount to crimes， not only almost sparked an “international image crisis” for China， but were also used by the Japanese right-wing forces to the advantage of their candidates in the country’s election. As a result， the friendliness of the Japanese people towards the Chinese people has hit a new low， and the Japanese right-wing politicians， after winning the election， became more hostile and aggressive towards China. That said， it is necessary to follow closely the future development of China-Japan relations and take precautions against the Japanese right-wing anti-China forces. Besides， the rising number of Chinese people traveling and shopping in Japan has nothing to do with politics， rather it is attributable to a weakening of the Japanese yen against the Chinese yuan and Japan’s streamlined visa application process for Chinese visitors. Chinese factories and businesses should view this as an opportunity to study the market demand in Japan and accordingly develop marketable， good-quality and better-priced goods.
Fifth， some in China hold that Japanese society is on the whole drifting to the right， therefore whoever takes office next will not make much difference. This， however， is an overgeneralization， not a fact. Although Yohei Kono and other moderate liberals have pointed out that Japan has drifted to the right since the end of the Cold War， this does not necessarily follow that there are no good-natured people in Japan. Throughout 2015， Abe also met with quite some internal opposition， be it to his visiting the Yosukuni Shrine， his ramming through the new security bills， his speech on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the war’s end， his attempt to amend the Constitution or his position on the US marine base on Okinawa. Some middle school students and housewives even took to the streets to join the protests against Abe’s Cabinet ramming through the new security bills. Some Japanese non-governmental groups organized meetings where people who experienced the Nanjing Massacre gave speeches about that ordeal， in part to go against the Japanese right-wing forces and stop Japan from continuing to move to the right. Meanwhile， some parliament members， local governments and nongovernmental groups want to improve Japan’s relations with China. Many young members of the Japanese parliament， while visiting China， paid special visits to the memorials in Beijing， Nanjing and Shenyang， thus further cementing their determination to promote the friendship between China and Japan. Given that the issue of Diaoyu Islands has long been stalled， so much so that the most Japanese people， including the left-wing forces in the Communist Party of Japan， are under the impression that the islands belong to Japan， it is not proper to view Japan’s position on the Diaoyu Islands as a sign that the country as a whole is drifting to the right.
Looking to the future of China-Japan relations， we need to be aware of the crux of the problem and have confidence in the bright prospects for the relations. After all， what shapes China-Japan relations is the sovereignty dispute over the Diaoyu Islands. And if the Japanese people could gain a real understanding of the true historical story and the Japanese government could ditch the antiquated geopolitical thinking and pursue peace and cooperation with China at sea and on land， China and Japan are bound to find a solution to this long-standing thorny issue. Despite the odds that are against this now， there is reason to be optimistic that the friendship between China and Japan can be forged for generations to come.