有权力的经理人会支付给员工更高还是更低的工资?现有的几种主流的委托代理理论给出了完全不同的预测。本文提出,一个有权力的经理人对待员工的态度取决于他在追逐哪一类的私人收益,而后者进一步取决于劳动力保护等外部环境和大股东监督力度等内部治理结构。本文提出四个具体的假说,并使用一套中国非上市公司的数据来检验。实证分析发现:若总经理的权力大于最大的股东,则企业支付给蓝领和白领工人的工资都更低。通过对中国劳动力市场和产品市场以及非上市公司的特征的描述,本文认为,在这样的环境下,有权力的经理人有着很强的动机来通过削减员工工资以增强短期内的业绩。此外,有些因素会显著地影响经理人削减工资的幅度,包括:企业内部劳工的力量以及所在区域的劳动保护程度、内部公司治理结构、外部产品市场的竞争程度,以及企业更关注于长期还是短期的发展。 Will powerful managers pay higher or lower salaries to employees? Several current mainstream principal-agent theories give quite different predictions. This paper argues that the attitude of a powerful manager to employees depends on which type of private income he is chasing, and the latter is further dependent on the internal governance structure such as the external environment such as labor protection and the supervision of major shareholders. This paper presents four specific hypotheses and tests using a set of data from Chinese unlisted companies. Empirical analysis found that if the general manager’s power is greater than the largest shareholder, the wages paid to blue-collar workers and white-collar workers are lower. By describing the characteristics of China’s labor market and product markets as well as unlisted companies, this paper argues that under such circumstances, powerful managers have a strong incentive to enhance their short-term performance by cutting staff salaries. In addition, there are factors that can significantly affect the rate at which managers cut their wages, including: the power of labor within the company and the level of labor protection in the region, the internal corporate governance structure, the degree of competition in the external product market, and the companies’ focus on long-term or short-term development of.