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本文旨在说明早期海德格尔现象学的超越论特征,即《存在与时间》中的现象学突破仍然是在胡塞尔所创立的超越论现象学框架内实现的。为此,我们依据海德格尔在《时间概念史导论》中的专门论述,阐明早期海德格尔和胡塞尔现象学理念的共识和分歧,进而借助前者的独特问题意识表明《存在与时间》中的现象学堪称超越论现象学的彻底化。
The purpose of this paper is to illustrate the transcendental character of early Heidegger’s phenomenology, that is, phenomenological breakthrough in Existence and Time is still implemented within the framework of transcendental phenomenology founded by Husserl. Therefore, based on Heidegger’s special discourse in The Introduction to the Concept of Time, we clarify the consensus and disagreements between the early Heidegger and Husserl’s phenomenological concepts, and then use the unique consciousness of the former to show “existence and time” Phenomenology is called transcendental phenomenology of thorough.