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基于新经济地理学的视角,通过构建模型解析了财政分权情境下中国地方政府制定碳减排标准的微观机理。结合1995—2012年28个省市的面板数据,利用随机前沿分析法进一步测算了全要素碳减排效率,并以其为因变量验证了财政分权对碳减排的内在联系。研究发现财政分权与CO2减排效率之间呈倒U型关系,即适当的财政分权有利于提高CO2减排效率,而过度分权则会适得其反,而就当下大部分地区财政分权状况而言,中央政府可以选择适当提高分权水平以提升CO2减排效率。同时,立足于不同的财政分权水平,地方政府保护主义引发的市场分割将会进一步改变财政分权对碳减排效率的影响。
Based on the perspective of new economic geography, this paper analyzes the micro-mechanism of setting carbon emission reduction standards by Chinese local governments in the context of fiscal decentralization. Based on the panel data of 28 provinces and cities from 1995 to 2012, the stochastic frontier analysis method is used to further estimate the total factor carbon emission reduction efficiency. The dependent variable is used to verify the inherent relationship between fiscal decentralization and carbon emission reduction. It is found that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between fiscal decentralization and the efficiency of CO2 emission reduction. That is, appropriate fiscal decentralization is conducive to raising the efficiency of CO2 emission reduction. However, excessive decentralization will be counterproductive. However, in the current situation of fiscal decentralization in most areas In terms of the central government can choose to appropriately raise the level of decentralization to enhance the efficiency of CO2 emission reduction. At the same time, based on different levels of fiscal decentralization, the market segmentation triggered by local government protectionism will further change the impact of fiscal decentralization on carbon efficiency.