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随着面向市场化、商业化的不断发展,我国公司面临着严峻的企业代理问题,如何有效的激励和监督高管的问题亟待解决。本文立足于中国实情,选取了381家主板上市公司为样本,时间跨度为2002年至2012年,主要研究了公司治理结构以及由高管现金薪酬、高管持股比例、股权激励措施组成的高管激励体系对于公司业绩的影响,发现国有股份比例越高,独董工作地点与公司所在地一致以及董事长与CEO为同一人时,公司业绩会受到负面影响;而相反的,高管激励体系中的各个因素都对公司业绩产生了积极的影响。进一步的,我们研究了以公司规模、国有股份等因素对激励体系的激励效应产生的不同影响。文章指出,公司规模越大会使得所有激励措施的激励效应变得更弱,而国有股份比例的提高,将增强现金薪酬的激励效应。
With the continuous development of marketization and commercialization, Chinese companies are faced with serious agency problems. How to effectively motivate and supervise senior management problems needs to be solved urgently. Based on the facts of China, this paper selects 381 listed companies from the main board as a sample, with a time span of from 2002 to 2012. It mainly studies the corporate governance structure and high-level cash compensation, executive shareholding ratio and equity incentive measures Incentive system for the company’s performance, found that the higher the proportion of state-owned shares, independent director workplace and the location of the company and the chairman of the same CEO, the company’s performance will be negatively affected; the contrary, the executive incentive system The various factors have a positive impact on the company’s performance. Further, we study the different effects on the incentive effects of the incentive system based on factors such as company size and state-owned shares. The article points out that the larger the company size, the weaker the incentive effect of all the incentive measures. The increase of the proportion of state-owned shares will enhance the incentive effect of cash compensation.