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腐败与反腐败一直是公众关注的话题。在近20年中,中国的高官腐败现象越来越普遍。与普通官员相比,高官因为拥有更大的权威,可能对其他官员产生更强的示范效应,进而促进腐败行为的扩散,出现了“上梁不正,下梁歪”的社会现象。腐败对国家经济的发展和社会的公平正义是一个很大的威胁。为探寻反腐败以及预防腐败的有效机制,本文从“示范效应”的理论视角,基于社会互动的理论基础,通过建立高官与普通官员之间的Stackelberg竞争模型,分析了高官与普通官员之间的腐败博弈,发现了“示范效应”视角下存在的腐败问题,进而提出了反腐的可行性建议。
Corruption and anti-corruption have always been a public concern. In the past 20 years, corruption among senior officials in China has become more and more common. Compared with ordinary officials, senior officials may exert stronger demonstration effect on other officials because of their greater authority, thereby promoting the proliferation of corrupt practices and creating a social phenomenon characterized by “unreasonable and unfounded positions.” Corruption is a great threat to the economic development of the country and to social justice. In order to find an effective mechanism to combat corruption and prevent corruption, based on the theoretical basis of “demonstration effect” and based on the social interaction theory, through the establishment of the Stackelberg competition model between senior officials and ordinary officials, this paper analyzes the relationship between senior officials and ordinary officials Between the corruption game, found the corruption problem exists under the perspective of “demonstration effect”, and then put forward the feasibility of anti-corruption recommendations.