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从政府补助这一外生变量入手,以2007-2015年中国A股亏损和非亏损公司的数据为样本,首次检验了政府补助与高管外部薪酬差距的关系。研究发现,政府补助与高管外部薪酬差距之间的关系因企业盈利状况不同而存在不同机理,不能一概而论。(1)对于非亏损企业,企业获得的政府补助与高管外部薪酬差距正相关,且政府补助导致的这部分增加的差距抑制了对企业业绩的促进作用,证实了政府补助助长了非亏损企业的高管外部薪酬差距。而剔除政府补助影响的高管外部薪酬差距仍与绩效正相关。(2)亏损企业获得的政府补助与高管外部薪酬差距无显著关系。本文的研究避免了高管与员工不对等产生的薪酬差距比较偏误,丰富了政府补助在不同盈利状况企业作用效果的研究,为相关部门制定企业高管薪酬结构相关政策提供了理论和经验证据。
Starting from the exogenous variable of government subsidy, taking the data of Chinese A-share loss and non-loss-making company from 2007 to 2015 as a sample, this paper first tests the relationship between government subsidy and the external pay gap of senior executives. The study finds that the relationship between government subsidies and the external pay gap of senior management is different due to different profitability of enterprises, and can not be generalized. (1) For non-loss-making enterprises, the government subsidies obtained by enterprises are positively related to the external pay gap of senior executives, and the increased gap caused by government subsidies inhibits the promotion of enterprise performance and confirms that government subsidies contribute to the growth of non-loss-making enterprises The external pay gap of executives. The external pay gap excluding government subsidies is still positively related to performance. (2) There is no significant relationship between the government grants received by loss-making enterprises and the external pay gap of senior executives. This study avoids the mismatch between the remuneration gap caused by the unequal senior management and employees, enriches the research on the effect of government subsidies in different profit-making enterprises, and provides theoretical and empirical evidence for the relevant departments to formulate policies on the remuneration structure of corporate executives .