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本文通过将受雇于基金公司控股股东或发起人的分析师与这些基金公司进行配对,研究这种雇佣关联的分析师荐股和基金持股之间的交互行为及其对投资者利益的影响。研究发现,分析师荐股评级是非独立的,存在为基金持股服务的行为,并且与基金公司有雇佣关联的分析师和声誉低的分析师的独立性更差。这些与基金公司具有关联关系的分析师在以下行为中表现得更为明显:分析师倾向于对基金公司已持有的股票发布更强的推荐,而基金公司则在分析师的推荐发布后显著减少该股票的持股数量。另外,虽然投资者按分析师荐股可以获得正的超额收益,但是分析师和基金的雇佣关联依然会负向影响投资者的利益。
This paper studies the interaction between the analyst-sponsor and the fund shareholding of such an employment-related analyst and their impact on the interests of investors by pairing the analysts who are employed by the controlling shareholder or sponsor of the fund company with the fund companies . The study found that analysts’ ratings are non-independent and exist as service providers for fund holding and have less independence from fund-firm-hired analysts and less-reputable analysts. Analysts tend to make stronger referrals to shares already held by fund companies, while fund companies are significantly better after the analyst’s recommendation is released Reduce the number of shares held by the stock. In addition, although investors can obtain positive excess returns according to the analyst’s recommendation, the employment relationship between analysts and the fund will still negatively affect the interests of investors.