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在美国,外国人是否有权担任行政职务是涉及平等保护的宪法议题。美国最高法院不曾否定公民身份与政治忠诚之间的基本联系,但在一定程度上接受了外国人参与公共治理、融入美国社会的诉求。在一部分案件中,最高法院采用严格审查基准,认为州法不应禁止特定外国人担任一般的非选任性行政职务;而在另一部分案件中,最高法院采用合理性审查基准,认为州法可以禁止特定外国人担任选任性行政职务以及重要的非选任性行政职务。此外,较之于州的立法,联邦立法在这一问题上得到了更高程度的司法尊让。然而,最高法院的平等保护分析存在逻辑悖论,有待于进一步完善。一方面,最高法院对于审查基准的选择完全依赖个案衡量,严格审查基准未能得到一贯坚持;另一方面,最高法院对于审查基准的适用具有明显的结果导向,相关司法论证在很大程度上徒具形式意义。
In the United States, whether foreigners have the right to hold administrative positions is a constitutional issue that involves equal protection. The Supreme Court of the United States never negated the basic relationship between citizenship and political loyalty, but to some extent accepted the appeal of foreigners to participate in public administration and integrate into American society. In some cases, the Supreme Court adopted a strict censorship benchmark, arguing that state law should not prohibit certain foreigners from holding general non-elective administrative positions, while in the other cases the Supreme Court used a reasonable examination of benchmarks that state law could prohibit specific foreign People served as the election of the executive and important non-elective administrative positions. In addition, federal legislation receives a much higher level of judicial respect for the issue than state legislation. However, there is a logical paradox in the Supreme Court’s equal protection analysis that needs to be further improved. On the one hand, the selection of the bench by the Supreme Court relies solely on the measurement of individual cases and the strict examination of the benchmarks has not been consistently adhered to. On the other hand, the Supreme Court has obvious result-oriented guidance on the application of the review benchmarks. The relevant judicial arguments are to a very large extent With the formal meaning.