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本文在Demerjian et al.(2013)研究的基础之上,进一步分析了管理者能力与盈余管理之间的作用机理。研究发现:管理者能力与盈余管理之间的关系受到企业真实业绩的影响。当企业真实业绩较好之时,管理者盈余管理动机较弱,管理者能力与盈余管理程度负相关;当企业真实业绩较差之时,管理者盈余管理动机较强,管理者能力与盈余管理程度正相关。管理者能力与盈余管理之间的关系支持匹配理论假说,即管理者会因动机不同,相机决定盈余管理程度。由于国有企业的特殊产权性质,以上结论仅在非国有企业中成立。
Based on the study of Demerjian et al. (2013), this paper further analyzes the mechanism of the interaction between managers’ ability and earnings management. The study found that the relationship between managers’ ability and earnings management is influenced by the real performance of the enterprise. When the real performance of enterprises is better, managers’ motivation of earnings management is weaker, managers’capabilities are negatively correlated with the degree of earnings management. When the real performance of enterprises is poor, motivation of managers’ earnings management is strong, managers’ ability and earnings management Degree is related. The relationship between managers’ ability and earnings management supports the matching theory hypothesis that the manager determines the degree of earnings management due to different motives. Due to the special nature of the state-owned enterprises, the above conclusion is only established in non-state-owned enterprises.