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运用CVaR方法考察了风险中性的供应商和风险规避的销售商联合促销下回购合同的协调问题.构造一个两阶段博弈模型:第一阶段,供应商设定回购合同;第二阶段,供应商实施促销决策,而销售商实施订购和促销决策.运用逆向归纳法对此博弈进行求解.研究表明:第二阶段博弈存在一个纳什均衡.当且仅当销售商的风险规避程度低于某一临界值,且渠道双方第一单位促销努力的边际收益小于其边际成本时,回购合同能够协调具有双边道德风险的供应链.最后用数值算例对文中结论进行了验证.
The CVaR method is used to investigate the coordination between the risk-neutral suppliers and the risk-averse sellers under the co-promotion contract.A two-stage game model is constructed: in the first stage, the supplier sets the repurchase contract; in the second stage, The supplier carries out the promotion decision, and the seller carries out the order and the promotion decision.Using the reverse induction method to solve the game.The research shows that there is a Nash equilibrium in the second stage game.If and only if the risk aversion of the seller is lower than some A critical value, and the marginal revenue of the first unit promotion effort on both sides of the channel is less than its marginal cost, the repurchase contract can coordinate the supply chain with bilateral moral hazard.Finally, numerical examples are used to verify the conclusions in the paper.