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由于不同股权结构下大股东对上市公司的控制能力存在着差异性,大股东以及被大股东所控制的管理层会对上市公司交易安排作出不同选择。股权的相对集中会造成股权制衡的困境,中小投资者虽然数量庞大,但是在实际的控股能力和对公司的经营影响力方面完全无法与大股东相抗衡,从而造成股权制衡机制无法发挥作用。在上市企业治理结构中,股东的控制权通过建立有效的股东内部控制机制和竞争的法人控制权市场来实施。要治理我国国有企业大股东利益侵占问题,应通过改变“一股独大”的现状,并重点关注终极控制人与上市公司之间形成的复杂的控制链。
Due to the differences in the controlling ability of major shareholders of listed companies under different ownership structures, major shareholders and the management controlled by major shareholders will make different choices for the trading arrangements of listed companies. The relative concentration of equity will lead to the plight of equity balance. Although large and medium-sized investors, they can not compete with the major shareholders in actual holding power and influence on the company’s operation, resulting in that the equity balancing mechanism can not play a role. In the corporate governance structure of listed companies, the shareholder’s control power is implemented by establishing an effective internal control mechanism of shareholders and a competing corporate control market. To control the problem of the major shareholders of state-owned enterprises in our country, we should change the status quo of “one single dominant” and focus on the complicated control chain formed between ultimate controllers and listed companies.