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本文对 Aghion and Tirole(1994)模型进行了扩展,建立了一个三阶段博弈模型考察在产权分割情况下不同产权安排方式对 R&D 产出的影响。首先,在客户先动(存在策略性效应)而且客户投资和研究者努力互补的情况下,产权分割导致 R&D 产出低于社会最优的结果保持不变。其次,如果客户(或研究者)具有安排产权的权威,则其选择的产权比例以极大化其投资(或努力)。如果产权比例由谈判决定,则任何一方产权的大小与他们对 R&D 活动的相对重要性呈正相关,而不是简单的1/2。最后,谈判解导致更高的 R&D 产出。
This paper extends the model of Aghion and Tirole (1994) and establishes a three-stage game model to examine the impact of different property rights arrangements on R&D output in the context of property rights division. First, when the customer first moves (there is a strategic effect) and the customer investment and the researcher work hard to complement each other, the division of property rights results in the R&D output being lower than the social optimal result. Second, if the client (or researcher) has the authority to arrange property rights, then the proportion of property rights it chooses to maximize its investment (or effort). If the proportion of property rights is negotiated, the size of the property rights of either party is positively related to their relative importance to R&D activities, rather than simply 1/2. Finally, negotiated solutions lead to higher R&D output.