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在零售商资金约束下,借助条件风险值(CVaR)理论研究了基于收益共享契约的风险中性供应商和风险厌恶零售商组成的两级供应链定价决策模型。根据零售商解决资金问题方式的不同,在零售商风险厌恶下分别对推迟支付模型和银行借款模型进行分析,给出了不同约束下的零售商和供应商最优定价决策以及系统与成员运作绩效。最后进行数值算例,研究结果发现,在零售商风险厌恶情况下,收入共享系数的大小决定零售商解决资金约束问题的方式,而收入共享系数的确定取决于双方的谈判能力。
Under the constraints of retailers’ funds, this paper studies the two-level supply chain pricing decision model based on the CVaR theory, which is based on the revenue-sharing contract between the risk-neutral supplier and the risk-averse retailer. According to the ways of retailers to solve the problem of funds, under the risk aversion of retailers, the models of postponement payment and bank loan are analyzed respectively. The optimal pricing decisions of retailers and suppliers with different constraints and the performance of systems and members are given . Finally, a numerical example is given. The results show that in the case of retailer risk aversion, the size of revenue sharing coefficient determines the retailer ’s way to solve the financial constraint problem. The determination of income sharing coefficient depends on the negotiation ability of both parties.