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本文从非经常性业绩的视角考察了企业高管扩大高管-员工薪酬差距的具体行为。研究发现,高管-员工薪酬差距与非经常性业绩存在显著的正向联系,其中非流动资产处置损益和金融投资收益推动了高管-员工薪酬差距,且各分量对高管-员工薪酬差距的影响均大于经常性业绩;当考虑产权背景时,国企中实体投资和政府补助对薪酬差距的影响更明显。另外,我们考察了要求考核高管业绩时有条件剥离非经常性业绩的《中央企业负责人经营业绩考核暂行办法2010》对地方国企的效应,结果并不显著。
This paper examines the specific behavior of senior executives in expanding executives-employee pay gap from the perspective of non-recurring performance. The study found that there is a significant positive relationship between executive compensation and non-recurring performance, in which non-current assets disposal gains and losses and financial investment returns promote executive-employee pay gap, and the various components of executive-employee pay gap The impact of both is greater than the current performance; when considering the background of property rights, state-owned enterprises in real investment and government subsidies on the pay gap more obvious. In addition, we examined the effect of the “Interim Measures for the Assessment of Operational Achievements of Central SOEs 2010” on local state-owned enterprises that require them to divest non-recurring performance conditions when examining their performance, and the results are not significant.