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该论文是一篇关于激励理论领域的纯理论性文章,作者围绕团队生产展开论述,通过一个两期模型说明了在动态博弈中,第一期团队内部激励对团队个体选择的影响,进而可以改变第二期外部委托人的预期以及团队个体的各自收益。文章涉及非完备信息下,博弈参与个体如何通过选择成本较高的努力程度、树立信誉,进而实现总体收益最优化的问题。现代经济学把建立在重复博弈模型上的逆向选择问题称为信誉理论。最初Kreps和Wilson(1982)以及Milgrom和Roberts(1982)为了解释Selten(1978)提出的连锁店悖论(chain-
The paper is a purely theoretical article on the field of motivation theory. The author focuses on the production of the team. Through a two-period model, it shows that in the dynamic game, the impact of the first phase of internal team incentives on individual team selection can be changed. The expectations of the external trustees of the second period and the individual returns of the individual teams. The article deals with the problem of how the individual participating in the game can realize the optimization of the overall income by selecting the higher cost effort and establishing the reputation under the incomplete information. Modern economics refers to the problem of adverse selection based on repeated game models as reputation theory. Originally, Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Milgrom and Roberts (1982) explained the chain paradox (chain-) proposed by Selten (1978).