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对轻型分组密码LBlock抗代数旁路攻击安全性进行了评估.给出了LBlock密码算法的代数方程表示方法,使用示波器采集微控制器ATMEGA324P上的LBlock实现功耗泄露,利用泊松相关系数方法推断加密中间状态汉明重,基于可满足性问题并转化为代数方程组,同LBlock密码算法代数方程联立,最后使用CryptoMinisat解析器进行方程组求解,成功恢复加密密钥.实验结果表明:微控制器上的LBlock实现易遭受代数旁路攻击,仅需一条功耗曲线,已知明密文下的3轮汉明重泄露、未知明密文条件下6轮汉明重泄露分别经2.4s和0.4s分析即可恢复80bit完整密钥.
This paper evaluates the robustness of LBlock anti-algebra bypass attacks, and presents the algebraic equation representation method of LBlock cipher algorithm. The oscilloscope is used to collect the LBlock of ATMEGA324P microcontrollers to realize the power leakage. The Poisson correlation coefficient method is used to infer Encryption of Hamming’s intermediate state, based on the satisfiability problem, is transformed into an algebraic equation set, which is combined with the algebraic equation of the LBlock cryptographic algorithm. Finally, the CryptoMinisat resolver is used to solve the system of equations and the encryption key is successfully recovered. The experimental results show that the micro- The LBlock implementation on the device is vulnerable to algebraic bypass attacks, requiring only one power curve, known for three rounds of Hamming heavy leaks under the explicit ciphertext, six rounds of Hamming heavy leaks under unknown ciphertext conditions, respectively after 2.4s and 0.4 s analysis can restore 80bit complete key.