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本文构建了企业技术外包活动中技术需求企业与创新提供商之间的委托代理问题。由于直接面临研发风险,创新提供商为风险厌恶参与者,本文使用在险价值(Value-at-Risk)作为其风险厌恶程度的测度,并在此基础上求解最优合同参数,与传统均值—方差(M-V)效用函数的对比发现:1)随着风险波动的加剧,VaR测度下单位支付增加,而在M-V效用函数下降低;2)随着风险厌恶水平的提高,合同单位支付增加,而M-V效用函数降低;3)随着风险厌恶水平的提升,VaR下的固定支付部分也相应增加;4)VaR的两个要素对于合同的固定支付与单位支付的影响不同,保留利润水平不会影响单位支付水平,而置信水平对二者均有影响。VaR测度在克服M-V方法理论缺陷的同时,将提供更符合直觉的管理启示。
This paper constructs the principal-agent problem between technology-demand enterprises and innovation providers in the technology outsourcing activities. Because of the direct risk of R & D and innovation provider as risk-averse participants, this paper uses Value-at-Risk as a measure of risk aversion, and on the basis of which the optimal contract parameters are solved and compared with the traditional mean- A comparison of the utility function of variance (MV) found that: 1) As the risk volatility aggravates, unit payment increases under the VaR measure and decreases under the MV utility function; 2) As the level of risk aversion increases, the contract unit pays an increase while MV utility function is reduced; 3) As the level of risk aversion increases, the fixed payment part under VaR also increases accordingly; 4) The two factors of VaR have different impact on fixed contractual payment and unit payment and retained profit level Unit payment levels, while the level of confidence have an impact on both. The VaR measure will provide a more intuitive management enlightenment while overcoming the theoretical flaws of the M-V approach.