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重复博弈理论认为,如果存在无限次的重复博弈,人们最终会形成自发的合作秩序。然而中国农田水利运行的实践表明,即使农户之间存在长期的用水博弈,自发的合作也不一定能达成。原因在于:由整合能力、参与能力与执行能力构成的农村社区能力的弱化,使得水利博弈合作因为上下游不对称而产生的参与成本、因为用水协商而产生的整合成本以及因为惩罚搭便车行为而产生的执行成本无法得到有效的化解。而导致社区能力弱化的原因,主要是农村社会的原子化以及农村基层组织的虚化。通过对农村社区能力的重建,农田水利的合作有可能在重复博弈的过程中最终实现。
Repeated game theory holds that if there are infinite repeated games, people will eventually form a spontaneous cooperative order. However, the practice of farmland water conservancy operation in China shows that spontaneous cooperation may not be achieved even though there is a long-term water game between farmers. The reason is that the weakening of the ability of rural communities composed of integration ability, participation ability and executive ability makes participation costs of water game cooperation due to upstream and downstream asymmetry, integration cost caused by water consultation and punishment of free riders The resulting implementation costs can not be effectively resolved. The reasons leading to the weakening of community ability are mainly the atomization of rural society and the weakening of rural grassroots organizations. Through the reconstruction of the ability of rural communities, the cooperation of farmland and water conservancy may be finally realized in the process of repeated game.