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有限理性的IJV成员在进行机会主义行为策略选择时必然会受到外界环境不确定性的影响.引入漂移来刻画这种影响,并运用演化博弈理论,建立带有漂移项的“蜈蚣博弈”模型,对有限理性参与人的国际合资企业(IJV)的机会主义行为进行分析.通过对一轮学习、二轮学习和五轮学习的“蜈蚣博弈”中各参数变化的数值计算,分析得出,外界环境越动荡,IJV成员机会主义行为的可能性反而越小;而外界环境越稳定,IJV成员机会主义行为的可能性却越大;并且IJV成员的机会主义行为还受成员长短期定位、预期收益及投入成本等因素的影响.
Bounded rationality of IJV members in the choice of opportunistic behavior strategy will inevitably be affected by the uncertainty of the external environment.Improve the drift to characterize this effect, and the use of evolutionary game theory, the establishment of a drift term “centipede game ”, Model to analyze the opportunistic behavior of international joint ventures (IJVs) with limited rational participants.Through the numerical calculation and analysis of the change of each parameter in the “centipede game” of one round of study, two rounds of study and five rounds of study, It is concluded that the more turbulent the external environment, the less likely the IJV members are opportunistic. On the contrary, the more stable the external environment is, the more likely the IJV members will be opportunistic. And the opportunistic behavior of IJV members is also affected by members’ short-term Positioning, expected revenue and input costs and other factors.