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伽达默尔在他的重要哲学著作《真理与方法》的开篇提到,由于归纳逻辑在社会科学领域的运用,精神科学在19世纪西方世界得到了长足发展。但是,和过分依赖于经验材料的气象学一样,以社会现象为研究对象的精神科学一直以来也因其不精确性,而显得极为特殊。十九世纪的人们,在德国以赫尔曼·赫尔姆霍茨和狄尔泰为代表,极力想维护精神科学的独立性,让精神科学成为一门独立于自然科学的科学群。但由于他们深受自然科学模式方法论的影响,这种努力并未能取得实质性的效果。伽达默尔指出,如果我们只是以这样一种对于规律性不断深化的认识为标准去衡量精神科学,那么我们就不能正确的把握精神科学的本质。社会—历史认识的理想应是,在现象的一次性和历史性的具体关系中去理解现象本身。
Gadamer, at the opening of his important philosophical book Truth and Methodology, mentioned that due to the use of inductive logic in the field of social science, the development of the science of the mind in the western world in the nineteenth century was well developed. However, as with meteorology, which relies too much on empirical material, psycho-science, which studies social phenomena, has always been very special because of its inaccuracy. The nineteenth-century people, represented by Hermann Helmholtz and Dilthey in Germany, tried their best to preserve the independence of psycho-science and make it a scientific group independent of the natural sciences. However, due to their being influenced by the methodology of the natural sciences model, such efforts have not achieved any substantial results. Gadamer pointed out that if we measure psycho-science only on the basis of such an understanding of ever-deepening regularity, then we can not correctly grasp the essence of psycho-science. The ideal of social-historical understanding should be to understand the phenomenon itself in the concrete one-time and historic relationship of phenomena.