基于不完全信息静态博弈模型,讨论了相互竞争的两厂商在双方都掌握的线性需求函数和一方随机选取的线性成本函数这样的不完全信息情况下实施三度价格歧视的有效性问题,且给出了双方实施三度价格歧视的最优产量,最优价格以及最大利润公式,并把相关结论与基于完全信息静态博弈的三度歧视定价和不完全信息静态博弈的统一定价进行对比,得出了许多重要的结论. Based on the incomplete information static game model, this paper discusses the validity of the implementation of the third degree price discrimination between two competing firms under the assumption of both linear demand function and one linearly selected cost function. The optimal yield, the optimal price and the maximum profit formula of the three price discrimination between the two parties are obtained, and the related conclusions are compared with the uniform pricing of the third degree discriminative pricing and the incomplete information static game based on the static game of complete information. A lot of important conclusions.