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本文考察了股东与管理者之间的代理成本、年报附注中弹性信息披露对审计师出具非标准审计意见的影响,发现代理成本与审计师出具非标准审计意见的概率正相关,而弹性信息披露水平与审计师出具非标准审计意见的概率负相关。在此基础上,我们还考察了在代理成本的作用下弹性信息披露对审计意见的影响,发现弹性信息披露在除总资产周转率外其他三种代理成本较大时与上市公司得到非标准审计意见的概率负相关,而在总资产周转率较高时才对审计意见有显著影响。
This paper examines the agency costs between shareholders and managers, the impact of flexible information disclosure in the annals of the annual reports on auditors’ issuance of non-standard audit opinions, and finds that the agency costs are positively related to the probability of the auditors issuing non-standard audit opinions, while the flexible information disclosure The level is negatively correlated with the probability of the auditor issuing non-standard audit opinions. On this basis, we also examine the impact of the disclosure of flexible information on the audit opinion under the influence of agency costs. We find that the disclosure of flexible information can not meet the requirements of listed companies when the other three types of agency costs are larger than the total asset turnover. Negative opinion on the probability of opinion, and the higher the total asset turnover only when the audit opinion has a significant impact.