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我国正处于经济转型期,债转股可以减轻企业债务压力,使企业重新焕发活力,继而拉动经济增长。然而,债转股后的企业可能选择偷懒的策略,这一道德风险严重影响了债转股的实际效果。本文从演化经济学的视角,通过构建演化博弈模型,分析出企业和银行两大主体的动态博弈过程,并利用Matlab进行数值模拟
China is in the process of economic restructuring. Debt-equity swaps can reduce the pressure on corporate debt and enable enterprises to rekindle their vitality and thus stimulate economic growth. However, after the debt-equity swap business may choose lazy strategy, a moral hazard has seriously affected the actual effect of debt-for-equity. This article from the perspective of evolutionary economics, through the construction of evolutionary game model, analyzes the dynamic game process of the two main bodies of enterprises and banks, and carries out numerical simulation using Matlab