公共预算是现代国家最重要的财政问责制。该预算管理活动需要在总体资源有限的情况下,对可支配资源进行合理的安排、配置与调整,以满足社会公众的公共需要。针对预算管理中出现的运行效率、资源配置效率低等现象,文章通过“委托代理理论、寻租理论”对公共预算管理中的资源配置现状进行分析,借助博弈论探讨导致“低效率资源配置”现象的影响路径,并基于“激励约束”视角,说明在公共预算管理中构建激励约束机制的必要性。 Public budgets are the most important financial accountability in modern countries. This budget management activity needs reasonable arrangement, allocation and adjustment of disposable resources under the condition of limited overall resources so as to meet the public needs of the public. In view of the running efficiency and inefficient allocation of resources in budget management, this paper analyzes the current situation of resource allocation in public budget management through “principal-agent theory and rent-seeking theory Resource allocation ”phenomenon, and based on the“ incentive constraint ”perspective, illustrates the necessity of building an incentive constraint mechanism in public budget management.