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反倾销措施的实施为国内进口竞争性企业提供了保护,但由于高额的反倾销税会诱使外国企业直接投资,构成对国内竞争企业的威胁。因此,当存在跨越关税壁垒的外国直接投资的可能时,国内进口竞争企业一定程度上会减少反倾销申诉,以降低外国企业直接投资的可能。外国企业也会在反倾销保护措施实施前采取战略性的出口行为,以化解进口国的贸易保护威胁。国内竞争企业寻求保护的努力与外国企业化解反倾销威胁的博弈过程表明,反倾销保护需求与外国企业直接投资之间存在必然的关系。
The implementation of anti-dumping measures has provided protection to domestic import competitive enterprises, but as a result of high anti-dumping duties, foreign enterprises are induced to invest directly, posing a threat to domestic competitive enterprises. Therefore, when there is a possibility of foreign direct investment (FDI) crossing tariff barriers, domestic import competitors will reduce anti-dumping complaints to a certain extent to reduce the possibility of direct investment by foreign enterprises. Foreign enterprises will also take strategic export actions prior to the implementation of anti-dumping measures to ease the threat of trade protection in importing countries. The game process between the efforts of domestic competition enterprises seeking protection and the anti-dumping threats of foreign enterprises shows that there is a necessary relationship between the demand for anti-dumping protection and the direct investment of foreign enterprises.