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While running for President of the Philippines and even after being elected， Rodrigo Duterte said he intended to adjust the Philippine’s foreign policies， especially the South China Sea policy pursued under President Benigno Aquino III. But there is inconsistency or contradiction between his remarks. Duterte’s remarks during the campaign featured his personal style， and also served to garner voters’ attention and support. The adjustment of the Philippines’ South China Sea policy under Duterte is expected to be based on Aquino’s political legacy， subject to the struggle and equilibrium among domestic interest groups， and coordinated with the overall China policy of the United States.
Aquino’s Political Legacy for Duterte to Deal with
Under President Aquino， the Philippines’ foreign policy typically sided with the United States in the China-US strategic rivalry. Soon after taking office， Aquino completely abandoned the balanced stance between China and the United States adopted by the previous administration， and turned to a one-sided pro-United States and China-bashing policy. Contrary to the swift upgrade in US-Philippines relations， China-Philippines relations witnessed a dramatic deterioration during Aquino’s term.
The Aquino administration held high expectations of the United States， and attempted to frame the Philippines’ confrontation with China over Huangyan Island （Scarborough Shoal） within the jurisdiction of US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty. Despite a statement by the United States that it would carry out the obligations stipulated in the Treaty， but without clarifying whether Huangyan Island falls within the Treaty’s jurisdiction， the Aquino government pushed forward an assertive agenda in the South China Sea. Regardless of the consensus reached in the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea to “resolve territorial and jurisdictional disputes through friendly consultations and negotiations by the sovereign states directly concerned，” as well as China’s declaration under Article 298 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea to opt out of the compulsory binding dispute settlement regime for disputes concerning sea boundary delimitation and sovereignty， Aquino brought the China-Philippines South China Sea disputes to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea， thus unilaterally initiating the compulsory arbitral proceedings in the dispute settlement regime of UNCLOS.
The Aquino government’s action to resort to international arbitration seriously hindered the mutual trust between China and the Philippines， and blocked the political channel for the two countries to improve their relations. To gain in its confrontation with China， the Philippines signed with the United States an Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement which has an initial term of 10 years. The Agreement made possible the US military presence in the Philippines on a rotational stationing basis. Although dissent exists within Manila’s political circle concerning this increase of US military deployment， the Agreement had the support from the Philippines’ Supreme Court in January 2016 and started to take effect. Accordingly， the Philippines will provide the US military with several domestic bases to meet the rotation demand of US aircraft， vessels and personnel. In the six years under President Aquino’s rule， not only did Manila establish a closer alliance with Washington， it also opened military bases for US use， which is highly consistent with the latter’s strategic adjustment in the Asia-Pacific region， a reorientation that views China as an imaginary enemy. The Philippines’ US policy actually serves to coordinate with the United States’ strategy of “rebalancing” to the Asia-Pacific and “return” to Southeast Asia， and consequently ties it to the US Asia-Pacific strategy as a chess piece against China.
Duterte’s Political Experience
Though labeled a democracy， politics in the Philippines are still under the influences of clans， a characteristic background that no political figure can evade and that lays the foundation for Duterte’s rule as president.
Rodrigo Duterte’s father was the Mayor of Danao， Cebu， and the Governor of the Province of Davao. His uncle Ramon Duterte was the mayor of Cebu City from 1957 to 1959， and his son Ronald Duterte held the same position from 1983 to 1986. As for Rodrigo Duterte himself， he served seven terms as the Mayor of Davao City for a total of 22 years in the period from 1988 to 2015. While he has gained rich experience in local governance， he has not held any important post in central government. In May 2016’s general election， in which Duterte won the presidency， his daughter and son were respectively elected as the Mayor and the Vice Mayor of Davao City by a wide margin， and successfully maintained the political influence of the Duterte family in the city.
As the mayor of Davao City， Duterte organized the Davao Death Squads and showed zero tolerance toward criminals， which turned Davao from the “murder capital of the Philippines” into what is considered one of the safest places in the world. Duterte’s strong hand won local support， but the Davao Death Squads were harshly criticized by international human rights organizations for executing criminals in disregard of the law. During the election campaign， Duterte was called “the Philippines’ Donald Trump，” largely because he frequently made controversial remarks. Not only did he accuse the Pope of causing serious traffic congestion during his visit to the Philippines， he has also made inappropriate remarks on the rape of an Australian missionary， which aroused discontent and condemnation from the Philippines’ Catholic Church， the United States and Australia. These controversies， however， have shaped a favorable image of Duterte among the public of being straightforward， outspoken， courageous， vigorous and resolute. Davao City under Duterte’s leadership has made numerous achievements in terms of its infrastructure， economy and urbanization. Opposing religious and clan discrimination， Duterte became the first mayor in the Philippines to grant formal representation to the indigenous Lumad and Muslim community. In 2013， Davao City sent rescue and medical teams to Tacloban to give aid to the victims of Typhoon Haiyan， locally known in the country as Typhoon Yolanda. Moreover， Duterte worked hard to secure peace talks with rebel groups in the South Philippines. The above achievements reveal Duterte’s capability to adapt to changes and make changes， which guarantees him wide public support， even though he has no experience in the central government.
The new president’s capability is also embodied in his campaign strategy. As the last of the five popular presidential candidates to announce he was running for president， Duterte expressed on multiple occasions that he would not be in the election before he formalized his bid on November 27， 2015， once even registering for the election for Davao’s mayor. Although the deadline had passed when Duterte made his announcement， the party that he belongs to had registered one member as a presidential candidate， and a candidate can be replaced by another candidate from the same party according to Philippine law. From his deliberately designed campaign， it can be seen that Duterte is not only a capable and determined policymaker， but he can also play well with the rules of the political game.
The South China Sea Challenge
The South China Sea issue is what President Aquino utilized to overturn the foreign policy of the previous Gloria Arroyo administration and change the domestic structure of vested interests. In fact， there is some special compatibility between Aquino’s grasp on South China Sea and the United States’ use of this issue to facilitate its “return to Asia” strategy， which is embodied not only in the substantial upgrade of the strategic security relations between the United States and the Philippines during Aquino’s term， but also the increasing influence of the Philippines’ military and energy interest groups on domestic politics and foreign policy.
After taking office， President Aquino repeatedly proposed to the Senate an increase in the defense budget， and then-Secretary of National Defense Voltaire Gazmin indicated that the Philippines does not have adequate resources to protect its “rights” in the South China Sea. The China-Philippines tensions gave Aquino a good excuse to increase the defense budget and the Philippines purchased military equipment from the United States and the Republic of Korea， including the Hamilton class warships， FA-50 aircraft and air-defense radar. The United States， Japan and Australia， among other countries， also upgraded their military support for the Philippines. In the wake of the Philippine Supreme Court’s recognition of the US-Philippines Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement， the Philippines has become a critical strategic pivot for the United States’ presence in Southeast Asia. The United States has acquired military bases in a region close to the South China Sea， and through so-called “rotational stationing” made permanent its military presence in the Philippines， which is significant for the United States to involve itself more deeply in the South China Sea issue， constantly pressure China， and demonstrate to its allies the reliability of its security commitments. The tensions of China-Philippines relations and the spiraling tensions in the South China Sea caused by the Aquino government’s radical policies all provided the United States with an excuse to strengthen its military presence in the country.
By entrusting its national security interests to the United States and bandwagoning on the United States’ global strategy， a stable circle of vested interest groups that benefit greatly from this foreign and security policy has already been cultivated in Manila. Seen from the current situation， the influence on social and political policymaking of the vested interest groups， which have subtle connections with the global hegemon and possess unique interests in the South China Sea issue， have become rather mature. It will be one of Duterte’s challenges after taking power to tackle the interest groups and the influence of the United States which stands behind them.
The energy interest group played a critical role in the radicalization of Aquino’s South China Sea policy. The Secretary of Foreign Affairs in Aquino’s government， Del Rosario， once worked for Philex Mining Corp.， whose subsidiary Philex Petroleum Corp. was authorized to conduct oil and gas exploration in Reed Bank in early 2011. In March the same year， after the corporation’s illegal drilling in Reed Bank was interrupted by China， the Aquino government sent two air fighters in an attempt to confront Chinese patrol vessels. The Philippines’ subsequent filing of its South China Sea case for international arbitration and signing of its new defense agreement with the United States were， to a large extent， a result of its pursuit of oil and gas in its so-called Exclusive Economic Zone.
Examined from the current situation in the South China Sea， it is difficult for Manila to conduct oil and gas exploration without Beijing’s consent. In fact， the energy interest group did not make substantial progress in either drilling or attracting foreign energy corporations. Therefore， now the arbitral tribunal’s ruling in the South China Sea case has been released， the Philippines’ energy interest group is highly likely to push the Duterte administration to attract international cooperation on oil and gas exploration by taking advantage of the ruling. A relatively strong sense of nationalism is now evident among the public in the Philippines concerning its maritime disputes with China. But as China’s diplomatic stance toward the Philippines has hit a historic low， it is not in Manila’s interests to continue deteriorating bilateral relations. With its increased cooperation with the United States in the South China Sea， any further moves will cause a resumption or even transcendence of the cooperation level during the Cold War， which is not in either Philippines’ national interests or the United States’ Asia-Pacific strategic interests. However， the influences of these various factors on Manila’s future South China Sea policy are different.
Duterte will be pressured from making any compromise by domestic nationalistic sentiments， but there is obviously no more space to continue Aquino’s radical policy either. As relations with the United States reach a plateau marked by intense cooperation， it will be another challenge for Duterte to deal with its troubled relations with China while handling the domestic pressures arising from interest groups and nationalism.
Balancing of Interests in the South China Sea
Early during his election campaign， Duterte started deliberating over the South China Sea issue， but the real balance of interests， especially of domestic ones， has just unfolded， including the handling of the arbitration ruling in the Philippine’s case against China， the pork-barrel political tradition， and domestic economic development and nationalism.
The South China Sea issue is a topic no candidate could shun during the campaign. Judging from his remarks， Duterte holds a relatively balanced opinion on this issue. He not only effectively wielded the campaign language， but also indicated his sober understanding of the issue. On one hand， Duterte clarified in his platform he would continue to pursue the international arbitration and the Philippine’s present sovereignty claims； on the other， he asserted that the disputes with China could not be solved by the tribunal. On one hand， he demanded China to respect the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone and alleged that he was ready to make sacrifices to protect Philippine “territories”； on the other， he emphasized that he would not wage a war against China and was willing to explore oil and gas in the South China Sea with China through joint ventures and welcomed China improving the Philippines’ infrastructure.
In the face of these complexities， Duterte will undoubtedly take advantage of the ruling to maximize the interests of himself and the Philippines. However， as the energy and military interest groups have benefited tremendously in the past few years， the balancing mechanism within the Philippines’s democratic system， namely the equilibrium among interest groups， is coming under increasing pressure. Duterte’s response to the arbitration ruling will be directly based on his consideration of domestic factors. From the perspective of domestic economic development and people’s actual demands， while the Philippines has witnessed remarkable growth in recent years， ordinary citizens have not gained much in the process. The lack of capital means the country still has a high rate of unemployment and the poor infrastructure. Aquino’s last-minute decision to join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank （AIIB） reflects the country’s demand for Chinese capital.
As a Filipino with Chinese blood， Duterte has expressed publicly on multiple occasions that he is proud of it. He has visited China many times to attract Chinese tourists and investment in Davao City， which under his leadership has become sister city of China’s Hefei City in Anhui province and Nanning City in the Guangxi Zhuang autonomous region. With his experience in local governance， Duterte is more likely than his predecessor to identify with the people’s desire for economic development and adopt a more practical approach to political and economic relations with China. During the campaign， Duterte once indicated that he would be willing to stop confronting China on the South China Sea issue as long as China helped the Philippines with infrastructure construction.
Something that the new president needs to take into consideration， however， is that Aquino’s South China Sea policy has already stirred up strong nationalistic sentiments domestically， which may be further intensified with the arbitral tribunal’s ruling in favor of the Philippines， which may force Duterte to take an uncompromising stance. The military， which plays a dominant role in the Philippines’ politics， also intends to maintain tensions on the sea to guarantee a bigger budget. The above factors will lay the foundation for Duterte’s adjustments and redesign of South China Sea policy after he takes office.
Judgments on Duterte’s Future Policies
Looking to the future， the academic and diplomatic circles in the Philippines have more or less expressed that the country should adjust its excessively pro-United States foreign policy and stop targeting China. As a long-serving local politician， Duterte well understands the national conditions and the people’s demands， and he made achievements in what the people are concerned about， including public security， economy， and anti-corruption in Davao City. Given Duterte’s distinct personal style and a political tradition of a new president overturning the preceding administration’s policies， it is obvious that Duterte will not completely inherit and continue Aquino’s foreign policy. There are close connections between the Philippines’ democratic system and interest groups. What appears to be a struggle for national interests in domestic and foreign policies is in fact a struggle among domestic interest groups. Considering that the Philippines has opened some military facilities to the United States， and the influence of military and energy interest groups on domestic politics， the legacy Aquino left Duterte is in the form of the two tough challenges of relations between the Philippines and the United States and the dispute between China and the Philippines. From this perspective， relations between China and the Philippines may not witness a swift and substantial change after Duterte’s inauguration， as some people hope.
Handling the ruling of the arbitration case against China is an inevitable mission for Duterte， and it will test the new president’s capacity to rule. Currently， there is no direct and effective communication at the top level between Manila and Beijing， and thus misunderstandings and misjudgments are possible. The challenge of the South China Sea arbitration ruling to bilateral relations is focused on Huangyan Island， whose jurisdiction both the Philippine government and the public are still concerned about. It has been a popular domestic political topic to take control of the island. While the new president may not continue hyping up the Huangyan Island issue as Aquino did， organized claims from fishermen for the government to protect their rights as stated by the ruling are still likely. Judging from Duterte’s personal style， he is not likely to unilaterally and publicly seek for conciliation with China in the face of such pressures. Bypassing existing disputes and traps will be critical for Duterte’s adjustment of foreign policy.
Aquino’s Political Legacy for Duterte to Deal with
Under President Aquino， the Philippines’ foreign policy typically sided with the United States in the China-US strategic rivalry. Soon after taking office， Aquino completely abandoned the balanced stance between China and the United States adopted by the previous administration， and turned to a one-sided pro-United States and China-bashing policy. Contrary to the swift upgrade in US-Philippines relations， China-Philippines relations witnessed a dramatic deterioration during Aquino’s term.
The Aquino administration held high expectations of the United States， and attempted to frame the Philippines’ confrontation with China over Huangyan Island （Scarborough Shoal） within the jurisdiction of US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty. Despite a statement by the United States that it would carry out the obligations stipulated in the Treaty， but without clarifying whether Huangyan Island falls within the Treaty’s jurisdiction， the Aquino government pushed forward an assertive agenda in the South China Sea. Regardless of the consensus reached in the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea to “resolve territorial and jurisdictional disputes through friendly consultations and negotiations by the sovereign states directly concerned，” as well as China’s declaration under Article 298 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea to opt out of the compulsory binding dispute settlement regime for disputes concerning sea boundary delimitation and sovereignty， Aquino brought the China-Philippines South China Sea disputes to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea， thus unilaterally initiating the compulsory arbitral proceedings in the dispute settlement regime of UNCLOS.
The Aquino government’s action to resort to international arbitration seriously hindered the mutual trust between China and the Philippines， and blocked the political channel for the two countries to improve their relations. To gain in its confrontation with China， the Philippines signed with the United States an Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement which has an initial term of 10 years. The Agreement made possible the US military presence in the Philippines on a rotational stationing basis. Although dissent exists within Manila’s political circle concerning this increase of US military deployment， the Agreement had the support from the Philippines’ Supreme Court in January 2016 and started to take effect. Accordingly， the Philippines will provide the US military with several domestic bases to meet the rotation demand of US aircraft， vessels and personnel. In the six years under President Aquino’s rule， not only did Manila establish a closer alliance with Washington， it also opened military bases for US use， which is highly consistent with the latter’s strategic adjustment in the Asia-Pacific region， a reorientation that views China as an imaginary enemy. The Philippines’ US policy actually serves to coordinate with the United States’ strategy of “rebalancing” to the Asia-Pacific and “return” to Southeast Asia， and consequently ties it to the US Asia-Pacific strategy as a chess piece against China.
Duterte’s Political Experience
Though labeled a democracy， politics in the Philippines are still under the influences of clans， a characteristic background that no political figure can evade and that lays the foundation for Duterte’s rule as president.
Rodrigo Duterte’s father was the Mayor of Danao， Cebu， and the Governor of the Province of Davao. His uncle Ramon Duterte was the mayor of Cebu City from 1957 to 1959， and his son Ronald Duterte held the same position from 1983 to 1986. As for Rodrigo Duterte himself， he served seven terms as the Mayor of Davao City for a total of 22 years in the period from 1988 to 2015. While he has gained rich experience in local governance， he has not held any important post in central government. In May 2016’s general election， in which Duterte won the presidency， his daughter and son were respectively elected as the Mayor and the Vice Mayor of Davao City by a wide margin， and successfully maintained the political influence of the Duterte family in the city.
As the mayor of Davao City， Duterte organized the Davao Death Squads and showed zero tolerance toward criminals， which turned Davao from the “murder capital of the Philippines” into what is considered one of the safest places in the world. Duterte’s strong hand won local support， but the Davao Death Squads were harshly criticized by international human rights organizations for executing criminals in disregard of the law. During the election campaign， Duterte was called “the Philippines’ Donald Trump，” largely because he frequently made controversial remarks. Not only did he accuse the Pope of causing serious traffic congestion during his visit to the Philippines， he has also made inappropriate remarks on the rape of an Australian missionary， which aroused discontent and condemnation from the Philippines’ Catholic Church， the United States and Australia. These controversies， however， have shaped a favorable image of Duterte among the public of being straightforward， outspoken， courageous， vigorous and resolute. Davao City under Duterte’s leadership has made numerous achievements in terms of its infrastructure， economy and urbanization. Opposing religious and clan discrimination， Duterte became the first mayor in the Philippines to grant formal representation to the indigenous Lumad and Muslim community. In 2013， Davao City sent rescue and medical teams to Tacloban to give aid to the victims of Typhoon Haiyan， locally known in the country as Typhoon Yolanda. Moreover， Duterte worked hard to secure peace talks with rebel groups in the South Philippines. The above achievements reveal Duterte’s capability to adapt to changes and make changes， which guarantees him wide public support， even though he has no experience in the central government.
The new president’s capability is also embodied in his campaign strategy. As the last of the five popular presidential candidates to announce he was running for president， Duterte expressed on multiple occasions that he would not be in the election before he formalized his bid on November 27， 2015， once even registering for the election for Davao’s mayor. Although the deadline had passed when Duterte made his announcement， the party that he belongs to had registered one member as a presidential candidate， and a candidate can be replaced by another candidate from the same party according to Philippine law. From his deliberately designed campaign， it can be seen that Duterte is not only a capable and determined policymaker， but he can also play well with the rules of the political game.
The South China Sea Challenge
The South China Sea issue is what President Aquino utilized to overturn the foreign policy of the previous Gloria Arroyo administration and change the domestic structure of vested interests. In fact， there is some special compatibility between Aquino’s grasp on South China Sea and the United States’ use of this issue to facilitate its “return to Asia” strategy， which is embodied not only in the substantial upgrade of the strategic security relations between the United States and the Philippines during Aquino’s term， but also the increasing influence of the Philippines’ military and energy interest groups on domestic politics and foreign policy.
After taking office， President Aquino repeatedly proposed to the Senate an increase in the defense budget， and then-Secretary of National Defense Voltaire Gazmin indicated that the Philippines does not have adequate resources to protect its “rights” in the South China Sea. The China-Philippines tensions gave Aquino a good excuse to increase the defense budget and the Philippines purchased military equipment from the United States and the Republic of Korea， including the Hamilton class warships， FA-50 aircraft and air-defense radar. The United States， Japan and Australia， among other countries， also upgraded their military support for the Philippines. In the wake of the Philippine Supreme Court’s recognition of the US-Philippines Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement， the Philippines has become a critical strategic pivot for the United States’ presence in Southeast Asia. The United States has acquired military bases in a region close to the South China Sea， and through so-called “rotational stationing” made permanent its military presence in the Philippines， which is significant for the United States to involve itself more deeply in the South China Sea issue， constantly pressure China， and demonstrate to its allies the reliability of its security commitments. The tensions of China-Philippines relations and the spiraling tensions in the South China Sea caused by the Aquino government’s radical policies all provided the United States with an excuse to strengthen its military presence in the country.
By entrusting its national security interests to the United States and bandwagoning on the United States’ global strategy， a stable circle of vested interest groups that benefit greatly from this foreign and security policy has already been cultivated in Manila. Seen from the current situation， the influence on social and political policymaking of the vested interest groups， which have subtle connections with the global hegemon and possess unique interests in the South China Sea issue， have become rather mature. It will be one of Duterte’s challenges after taking power to tackle the interest groups and the influence of the United States which stands behind them.
The energy interest group played a critical role in the radicalization of Aquino’s South China Sea policy. The Secretary of Foreign Affairs in Aquino’s government， Del Rosario， once worked for Philex Mining Corp.， whose subsidiary Philex Petroleum Corp. was authorized to conduct oil and gas exploration in Reed Bank in early 2011. In March the same year， after the corporation’s illegal drilling in Reed Bank was interrupted by China， the Aquino government sent two air fighters in an attempt to confront Chinese patrol vessels. The Philippines’ subsequent filing of its South China Sea case for international arbitration and signing of its new defense agreement with the United States were， to a large extent， a result of its pursuit of oil and gas in its so-called Exclusive Economic Zone.
Examined from the current situation in the South China Sea， it is difficult for Manila to conduct oil and gas exploration without Beijing’s consent. In fact， the energy interest group did not make substantial progress in either drilling or attracting foreign energy corporations. Therefore， now the arbitral tribunal’s ruling in the South China Sea case has been released， the Philippines’ energy interest group is highly likely to push the Duterte administration to attract international cooperation on oil and gas exploration by taking advantage of the ruling. A relatively strong sense of nationalism is now evident among the public in the Philippines concerning its maritime disputes with China. But as China’s diplomatic stance toward the Philippines has hit a historic low， it is not in Manila’s interests to continue deteriorating bilateral relations. With its increased cooperation with the United States in the South China Sea， any further moves will cause a resumption or even transcendence of the cooperation level during the Cold War， which is not in either Philippines’ national interests or the United States’ Asia-Pacific strategic interests. However， the influences of these various factors on Manila’s future South China Sea policy are different.
Duterte will be pressured from making any compromise by domestic nationalistic sentiments， but there is obviously no more space to continue Aquino’s radical policy either. As relations with the United States reach a plateau marked by intense cooperation， it will be another challenge for Duterte to deal with its troubled relations with China while handling the domestic pressures arising from interest groups and nationalism.
Balancing of Interests in the South China Sea
Early during his election campaign， Duterte started deliberating over the South China Sea issue， but the real balance of interests， especially of domestic ones， has just unfolded， including the handling of the arbitration ruling in the Philippine’s case against China， the pork-barrel political tradition， and domestic economic development and nationalism.
The South China Sea issue is a topic no candidate could shun during the campaign. Judging from his remarks， Duterte holds a relatively balanced opinion on this issue. He not only effectively wielded the campaign language， but also indicated his sober understanding of the issue. On one hand， Duterte clarified in his platform he would continue to pursue the international arbitration and the Philippine’s present sovereignty claims； on the other， he asserted that the disputes with China could not be solved by the tribunal. On one hand， he demanded China to respect the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone and alleged that he was ready to make sacrifices to protect Philippine “territories”； on the other， he emphasized that he would not wage a war against China and was willing to explore oil and gas in the South China Sea with China through joint ventures and welcomed China improving the Philippines’ infrastructure.
In the face of these complexities， Duterte will undoubtedly take advantage of the ruling to maximize the interests of himself and the Philippines. However， as the energy and military interest groups have benefited tremendously in the past few years， the balancing mechanism within the Philippines’s democratic system， namely the equilibrium among interest groups， is coming under increasing pressure. Duterte’s response to the arbitration ruling will be directly based on his consideration of domestic factors. From the perspective of domestic economic development and people’s actual demands， while the Philippines has witnessed remarkable growth in recent years， ordinary citizens have not gained much in the process. The lack of capital means the country still has a high rate of unemployment and the poor infrastructure. Aquino’s last-minute decision to join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank （AIIB） reflects the country’s demand for Chinese capital.
As a Filipino with Chinese blood， Duterte has expressed publicly on multiple occasions that he is proud of it. He has visited China many times to attract Chinese tourists and investment in Davao City， which under his leadership has become sister city of China’s Hefei City in Anhui province and Nanning City in the Guangxi Zhuang autonomous region. With his experience in local governance， Duterte is more likely than his predecessor to identify with the people’s desire for economic development and adopt a more practical approach to political and economic relations with China. During the campaign， Duterte once indicated that he would be willing to stop confronting China on the South China Sea issue as long as China helped the Philippines with infrastructure construction.
Something that the new president needs to take into consideration， however， is that Aquino’s South China Sea policy has already stirred up strong nationalistic sentiments domestically， which may be further intensified with the arbitral tribunal’s ruling in favor of the Philippines， which may force Duterte to take an uncompromising stance. The military， which plays a dominant role in the Philippines’ politics， also intends to maintain tensions on the sea to guarantee a bigger budget. The above factors will lay the foundation for Duterte’s adjustments and redesign of South China Sea policy after he takes office.
Judgments on Duterte’s Future Policies
Looking to the future， the academic and diplomatic circles in the Philippines have more or less expressed that the country should adjust its excessively pro-United States foreign policy and stop targeting China. As a long-serving local politician， Duterte well understands the national conditions and the people’s demands， and he made achievements in what the people are concerned about， including public security， economy， and anti-corruption in Davao City. Given Duterte’s distinct personal style and a political tradition of a new president overturning the preceding administration’s policies， it is obvious that Duterte will not completely inherit and continue Aquino’s foreign policy. There are close connections between the Philippines’ democratic system and interest groups. What appears to be a struggle for national interests in domestic and foreign policies is in fact a struggle among domestic interest groups. Considering that the Philippines has opened some military facilities to the United States， and the influence of military and energy interest groups on domestic politics， the legacy Aquino left Duterte is in the form of the two tough challenges of relations between the Philippines and the United States and the dispute between China and the Philippines. From this perspective， relations between China and the Philippines may not witness a swift and substantial change after Duterte’s inauguration， as some people hope.
Handling the ruling of the arbitration case against China is an inevitable mission for Duterte， and it will test the new president’s capacity to rule. Currently， there is no direct and effective communication at the top level between Manila and Beijing， and thus misunderstandings and misjudgments are possible. The challenge of the South China Sea arbitration ruling to bilateral relations is focused on Huangyan Island， whose jurisdiction both the Philippine government and the public are still concerned about. It has been a popular domestic political topic to take control of the island. While the new president may not continue hyping up the Huangyan Island issue as Aquino did， organized claims from fishermen for the government to protect their rights as stated by the ruling are still likely. Judging from Duterte’s personal style， he is not likely to unilaterally and publicly seek for conciliation with China in the face of such pressures. Bypassing existing disputes and traps will be critical for Duterte’s adjustment of foreign policy.