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在服务业中,多数产品或服务创新无专利保护,且几乎不存在模仿成本,当某一企业率先创新后,其他企业会纷纷模仿,因此创新激励不足。本文运用博弈论的方法,从创新成果被模仿企业即时模仿和滞后模仿两个层次研究了企业创新行为,得出在无产权保护条件下,如果创新成果的销售速度快于模仿者的模仿速度,有利于创新;模仿者进入模仿时间长,也有利于创新。
In the service industry, most products or services are innovated without patent protection, and there is almost no imitation cost. When a certain enterprise innovates, other enterprises will imitate one another, therefore, there is not enough motivation for innovation. This article uses game theory to study the innovation behavior of enterprises from the two aspects of innovation imitation and lag imitation, and concludes that under the condition of no property protection, if the sales of innovation achievement is faster than imitation imitation speed, Is conducive to innovation; imitators into imitation for a long time, but also conducive to innovation.