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文章在扩展风险投资家与风险企业家风险偏好的基础上,通过引入分段股权融资、控制权收益以及风险投资家监督成本、风险规避成本与战略性收益等变量,基于不完全契约的视角将Tirole(2001)企业融资模型扩展为两期动态过程。基于分段融资的信息发现过程建立两阶段风险企业控制权配置模型,分析初始阶段与中期信号显示阶段风险企业家自有财富、运营企业的非货币收益、人力资本专有性与专用性以及风险投资的专用性、风险规避度与战略性收益等因素对高新技术风险企业控制权配置的影响,得到了一系列结论,为有关高新技术风险企业治理已有的研究提供了有益的补充。
Based on the risk appetite of venture capitalists and venture entrepreneurs, the article introduces variables such as segmented equity financing, control return, venture capitalist supervision cost, risk aversion cost and strategic return. Based on the perspective of incomplete contract Tirole (2001) Enterprise Financing Model Expanded into Two Dynamic Processes. Based on the segmented financing information discovery process, a two-stage risk enterprise control allocation model is established to analyze the risk-entrepreneur’s own wealth, the non-monetary returns of operating enterprises, the exclusiveness and specialization of human capital and the risks The effects of investment specificity, risk aversion and strategic returns on the allocation of control power of high-tech venture capital firms have been analyzed and a series of conclusions have been obtained, which provide a useful supplement to the existing researches on high-tech venture capital governance.