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针对二级供应链中制造商隐藏成本信息和销售商隐藏努力行动引发的低效率问题,结合委托代理理论,引入一个虚拟第三方为利他的委托人,建立逆向选择和道德风险下供应链协调模型,来甄别制造商的真实成本且对销售商的努力实施有效激励,并通过模型求解得到供应链实现协调时各契约参数需满足的关系.结果表明,所设计的协调契约能够激励制造商自愿真实上报成本信息,刺激销售商寻求低成本的制造商进行合作并付出最优努力.最后,通过算例分析验证了契约模型对供应链协调的有效性.
In view of the low cost caused by hidden cost information of manufacturer in second-level supply chain and hidden action of seller, combined with principal-agent theory, this paper introduces a virtual third party as altruistic client, establishes supply chain coordination model under adverse selection and moral hazard , To identify the true cost of the manufacturer and to implement effective incentive to the seller’s efforts and to obtain the relationship between the contract parameters in the supply chain to achieve coordination through the model.The results show that the designed contract can inspire the manufacturer’s voluntary reality Reported the cost information, stimulated sellers to seek low-cost manufacturers to cooperate and make the best efforts.Finally, the effectiveness of the contract model on the supply chain coordination was verified by a numerical example.