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本文以2009~2013年江浙民营上市公司为研究对象,探讨内外部公司治理因素对企业非效率投资行为的抑制作用。研究结果表明:第一大股东持股比例与企业过度投资行为呈倒“U型”关系,对投资不足无显著抑制作用;股权制衡度、董事会规模、独立董事机制与企业的非效率投资行为均无显著的相关关系;董事长和总经理的两职合一及薪酬激励制度与过度投资呈显著的正相关关系;而管理层持股对企业的非效率投资无显著影响;外部治理中短期债务与过度投资无显著负相关,但加剧了企业的投资不足;长期债务在增加企业过度投资行为的同时,也抑制了企业的投资不足行为;产品市场竞争度并未发挥有效的治理效果,与企业投资不足显著正相关。
This article takes the private listed companies in Jiangsu and Zhejiang from 2009 to 2013 as the research object, and explores the inhibitory effect of internal and external corporate governance factors on the inefficient investment behavior of enterprises. The results show that: the proportion of the largest shareholder holding a “U-shaped” relationship with the overinvestment behavior of a company has no significant inhibitory effect on the underinvestment; the balance of ownership, the size of the board of directors, the independent director mechanism and the inefficient investment of an enterprise There was no significant correlation between the two directors and the general manager. There was a significant positive correlation between the two directors and the remuneration incentive system of the chairman and the general manager and overinvestment while the management shareholding had no significant effect on the inefficient investment of the enterprise. Short-term debt is not significantly negatively correlated with overinvestment, but exacerbates the underinvestment of enterprises. While long-term indebtedness increases the overinvestment of enterprises, it also inhibits the underinvestment of enterprises. The competitiveness of products does not exert effective governance effect, Significantly positive correlation with the underinvestment of enterprises.