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本文建立了股权二元结构下配股的理论模型,针对我国上市公司两类典型的公司治理结构——经理控制和大股东控制以及“一股独大”的股东结构,运用博弈论方法探讨了股权二元结构下配股对流通股和非流通股价值的影响。本文首次提出了配股的“再分配效应”——配股导致价值在流通股与非流通股之间转移,配股的“股权成本效应”——在非流通股股东不认购的情况下配股能降低公司的平均股权成本以及“配股中的搭便车现象”——流通股股东明知配股有损于流通股价值,在个体理性的驱使下仍然认购配股。本文揭示了股权二元结构与现行配股制度的缺陷,有助于解释我国股票市场与上市公司的一些重要实证现象。
This paper establishes a theoretical model of allotment under the dual structure of shareholding. In view of two typical corporate governance structures of listed companies in our country - manager control and shareholder control and the shareholder structure of “one domination”, this paper uses game theory to discuss equity Effect of Allocation of Shares on the Value of Tradable Shares and Non - tradable Shares under the Dual Structure. This paper first presents the “redistribution effect” of rights issue - the “share cost effect” of the rights issue by the rights issue between value-added shares and non-negotiable shares - the rights issue can reduce the price of the company when non-circulating shareholders do not subscribe The average cost of equity and the “free-riding phenomenon” in the rights issue - the shareholders of circulation shares know that allotment will detract from the value of the outstanding shares and will still subscribe for the rights issue driven by individual rationality. This article reveals the defects of the binary structure of shares and the existing rights issue system and helps to explain some important empirical phenomena of the stock market and listed companies in China.