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本文着重研究了不完全信息下拍卖市场的结构及其对拍卖市场交易效率的影响。通过合理地引入刻画市场结构的参数,对不完全信息下的拍卖市场作了“结构”上的分类;借助于拍卖市场博弈的贝叶斯均衡解,分析了不同市场结构对拍卖市场交易效率的影响,论证了在各种可能的市场结构中,当拍卖市场具有“完全竞争性”的市场结构时,拍卖市场的交易效率是最优的;通过求解参与人的最优市场结构,得到了拍卖市场中不同类型的参与人具有不同市场结构偏好的结论,并由此揭示了导致不完全信息下拍卖市场交易效率损失的根本原因。
This paper focuses on the structure of the auction market under incomplete information and its impact on the transaction efficiency of the auction market. By reasonably introducing the parameters characterizing the market structure, the auction market under incomplete information is classified as “structure”. By means of the Bayesian equilibrium solution of the auction market game, this paper analyzes the influence of different market structures on the transaction efficiency of the auction market It is proved that the transaction efficiency of the auction market is optimal when the auction market has a “perfectly competitive” market structure among all possible market structures. The auction is obtained by solving the optimal market structure of the participants Different types of participants in the market have different market structure preferences and thus reveal the root cause of the loss of transaction efficiency in the auction market under incomplete information.