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基于一次博弈模型的流速与拥塞控制方法虽然能解释用户的非合作行为,但是由于最终的均衡解的效率不高,影响了其应用价值.文中在讨论了一次博弈模型和流速均衡的解析解的基础上,对基于无限重复博弈模型的流速与拥塞控制行为进行了深入研究.提出了重复和无限重复流速与拥塞控制博弈模型,论证了重复博弈NEP的存在性和最优性,并讨论了重复博弈中贴现因子的意义.接着研究了N个用户的无限重复流速控制博弈中用户不合理行为的惩罚威胁策略,设计了无限和有限博弈中用户行为的惩罚约束方法.最后利用重复博弈模型中的结论,提出了一种基于重复博弈模型的流速率控制算法FCAR.仿真实验表明,FCAR算法能够较为有效地规范和约束用户不合理行为,促使理性的非合作用户达成合作,以实现整个流速与拥塞控制系统效用的最优.
Although the flow rate and congestion control method based on the one-time game model can explain the user’s non-cooperative behavior, its application value is affected by the inefficiency of the final equilibrium solution.In this paper, a game model and the analytic solution of the velocity-equilibrium are discussed Based on the research on the flow rate and congestion control behavior based on the infinite repeated game model, the game model of repeated and infinite repetitive flow and congestion control is proposed, and the existence and the optimality of repeated game NEP are demonstrated. The significance of the discount factor in game.Secondly, we study the penalty threat strategy of user irrational behavior in infinite repeat flow control game of N users and design a penalty constraint method of user behavior in infinite and limited game.Finally, using the repeated game model In conclusion, a flow rate control algorithm FCAR based on the repeated game model is proposed. Simulation results show that the FCAR algorithm can regulate and constrain users’ irrational behavior more effectively, and encourage rational non-cooperative users to cooperate to achieve the whole flow rate and congestion Optimal control system utility.