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会计盈余时效性反映了企业会计收益信息与实际经营成果的结合程度,是监督、评价经理人当期努力影响未来业绩的重要指标。根据委托代理理论中与股东利益相融合的薪酬委员会结构旨在增强经理人薪酬契约设计有效性的观点,对2010~2011年我国A股主板909家上市公司以加权最小二乘回归的分析结果显示,与股东诱因融合度高的薪酬委员会结构能够增强经理人薪酬-绩效敏感度,同时能够根据当期会计盈余时效性调整盈余的薪酬权重,避免经理人短视,降低代理成本。有经理人参与的薪酬委员会降低了薪酬委员会薪酬契约设计的有效性,非政府控制的上市公司经理人不兼任薪酬委员会委员情形下的薪酬委员会更加有效,未发现薪酬与审计委员会董事分离度会增强经理人薪酬-绩效敏感度。
Timeliness of accounting earnings reflects the combination of enterprise accounting income information and actual operating results, and it is an important indicator to supervise and evaluate managers’ current efforts to influence future performance. According to the perspective of the structure of the remuneration committee, which is integrated with the interests of shareholders, in order to enhance the effectiveness of the design of remuneration contract, the analysis of the weighted least-squares regression of 909 listed companies in China’s A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2011 shows . The structure of the remuneration committee, which has a high degree of integration with the shareholder incentive, can enhance the manager’s salary-performance sensitivity and at the same time, can adjust the surpluses of the remuneration according to the current accounting surpluses to avoid short-sighted managers and reduce agency costs. Remuneration Committee with Managers Reduced the Effectiveness of Remuneration Committee Remuneration Contract Design. Non-government-controlled listed company managers are more effective when they are not remuneration committee members. No remuneration will be found and the separation of audit committee directors is enhanced Manager Compensation - Performance Sensitivity.