论文部分内容阅读
超募融资是关系到资本市场资源配置效率的重要问题,一直受到社会公众和监管部门的深切关注。以我国IPO超募融资为背景,结合管理层权力理论,本文探讨了IPO超募对高管私有收益的影响。以2006-2011年上市公司为样本,本文研究发现:(1)整体上,超募融资的上市公司其高管获得更高的货币性和非货币性私有收益;(2)区分产权性质,这一现象在国有企业和非国有企业中均显著存在;(3)结合管理层权力分析,管理层权力的增大有助于高管获取高额的货币性和非货币性私有收益,但这一关系主要存在于非国有企业;(4)市场对超募公司为高管发放超额货币性私有收益的行为,给予了负面的反应,而对于发放超额非货币性私有收益的行为没有显著反应。本文的发现拓展了超募融资、管理层权力经济后果的相关研究,并为超募融资效率的监管提供了一定的启示。
Over-raising and financing is an important issue that relates to the efficiency of resource allocation in capital markets and has been deeply concerned by the public and regulatory authorities. Based on the background of IPO raising and financing in China and the theory of management power, this paper explores the impact of IPO over-raising on the private earnings of executives. Taking the listed companies from 2006 to 2011 as a sample, this paper finds: (1) As a whole, the top executives of listed companies that superfinally raise funds obtain higher monetary and non-monetary private benefits; (2) A phenomenon is obvious in the state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises; (3) With the analysis of management power, the increase of management power helps senior executives gain high monetary and non-monetary private benefits. However, (4) The market gave a negative response to the super-raised company’s payment of super-monetary private gain to supervisors, but did not react significantly to the issue of excess non-monetary private gain. The findings of this paper expand the relevant research on over-raised financing and power-economic consequences of management, and provide some enlightenment for the supervision of over-raised financing efficiency.