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对于我国各地竞相降低所得税负以吸引高新技术企业的做法,现有研究未能基于一般均衡角度分析其不利影响。文章通过在可计算一般均衡模型中引入以往研究所忽视的高新技术企业所得税率和风险报酬系数变量,利用“两税合并”前后的实际经济运行数据,分析了最优所得税率及其变化与一般均衡影响。研究发现,基于社会福利最大化角度,高新技术企业最优所得税率分别为18.24%和17.93%,且随着其风险报酬系数的增加而下降,并与CES生产函数的要素替代弹性分别呈正相关和倒U型关系。进一步对比不同均衡发现,过多的所得税优惠所带来的投资增长,是以社会整体福利和高新技术企业就业、产出及效率的下降为代价,且这种代价在非高新企业统一税率情形更为显著。因此,规范各地高新技术企业所得税优惠政策,在当前我国经济瓶颈已从投资约束转向效率约束的背景下,尤显必要。
For the sake of competing to reduce the income tax burden in various parts of our country to attract high-tech enterprises, the existing research fails to analyze its adverse effects based on the general equilibrium perspective. By introducing the high-tech corporate income tax rate and risk return coefficient variables neglected in past researches in the computable general equilibrium model, the paper analyzes the optimal income tax rate and its changes by using the actual economic operation data before and after the merger of “two taxes” And the general equilibrium effect. The study found that the optimal income tax rates for high-tech enterprises were 18.24% and 17.93%, respectively, based on the maximization of social welfare, and decreased as their risk-reward coefficient increased, which was positively correlated with the substitution elasticity of factors of CES production function Inverted U-type relationship. Further contrasting the different equilibriums shows that the investment growth brought by too much income tax concessions comes at the expense of the overall social welfare and the decline of employment and output and efficiency of high-tech enterprises, and this price is even higher in the case of non-high-tech enterprises with a unified tax rate For the obvious. Therefore, to standardize the preferential policies for income tax of hi-tech enterprises in various places is particularly necessary in the context of the current economic bottleneck in China shifting from investment constraints to efficiency constraints.